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Contractual Tax Reform 
 
Michael Abramowicz* and Andrew Blair-Stanek** 
 
 
Abstract: One-size-fits-all taxation fails to accommodate diverse taxpayer 
circumstances. This Article proposes allowing taxpayers to contract into 
alternative tax regimes administered by private intermediaries. Participating 
taxpayers would make payments to the intermediaries pursuant to contract, and the 
intermediaries would be required to pay to the government at least as much as these 
taxpayers would have paid the government otherwise. That amount is determined 
based on the actual tax receipts of a control group, taxpayers who wish to contract 
with an intermediary but instead are chosen at random to continue under the status 
quo. These alternative tax regimes might better accommodate taxpayers’ 
preferences, leaving the taxpayers with greater utility, without reducing 
government revenue. An intermediary could offer different substantive law, 
different procedural rules, or both. Taxpayers, for example, might receive lower 
tax rates in exchange for forgoing deductions that cause the taxpayer to engage in 
socially wasteful behavior. Advances in artificial intelligence make contractual tax 
reform feasible.  
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The same body of tax law applies to all taxpayers.1 This Article proposes 
upending this bedrock principle, allowing private intermediaries to offer alternative 
tax regimes. The government would insist that it receive at least as much tax 
revenue as it would have received under existing tax law, so the intermediaries 
would have powerful incentives to find packages of tax changes that would benefit 
individuals without lowering tax collections. For example, in exchange for lower 
rates, businesspersons might forsake the deduction for business travel2 or might link 
their cash register directly into the tax reporting system.3 Some taxpayers might 
agree to procedural rules that favor the government, in exchange for smoother tax-
reform processing. Allowing some parents a deduction for childcare expenses 
might make them more likely to work outside the home and thus actually increase 
tax collections.4 Alternative tax-rate structures with higher inframarginal and lower 
marginal rates might encourage some taxpayers to work harder, pay more taxes, 
and yet be happier as a result.5   
Contractual tax reform requires data about taxpayers that would help predict 
how much they would pay in an alternative tax regime. Much of the tax literature 
presumes that taxpayers have private information about themselves.6 Sometimes, 
the tax system can harness that information by allowing private parties to choose 
among different regimes.7 But for the exchanges suggested above, one cannot allow 
all taxpayers to opt in, because those most willing to give up benefits would be 
                                                 
1
 E.g., I.R.C. § 1(a) (“There is hereby imposed on the taxable income of… every married individual…”) 
(emphasis added); id. § 11(a) (“A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of every 
corporation.”) (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall 
be uniform throughout the United States”); United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 79 (1983) (“Such taxes 
must be uniform throughout the United States, and uniformity is achieved only when the tax operates with the 
same force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
Taxpayers may make certain elections from a limited menu provided by tax law, see infra note 236 and 
accompanying text, but they cannot order off the menu. 
2
 See Section I.A.1.  
3
 See Section I.C.2.  
4
 See Section I.A.2.  
5
 See Section I.B.2.  
6
 See ROBIN BOADWAY, FROM OPTIMAL TAX THEORY TO TAX POLICY 50 (2012) (“[A]symmetric information 
has been a key feature of normative tax analysis, particularly the fact that the government is imperfectly 
informed about relevant characteristics of private agents.”). Alex Raskolnikov, for example, suggests allowing 
taxpayers to choose between a “deterrence regime” with high penalties and a “compliance regime” with 
features such as binding arbitration. Alex Raskolnikov, Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target 
Tax Enforcement, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2009). 
7
 The goal of some proposals is to produce a separating equilibrium, where taxpayers have incentives to choose 
regimes in a way that is consistent with social welfare. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto 
Efficient Taxation, 17 J. PUB. ECON. 213, 230 (1982) (discussing a possible separating equilibrium). Those 
committed to gaming the tax system will generally choose the former, while others choose the latter. Id. at 
692–93 & 745–46. 




those least likely to use them. A businessperson who does not travel for business 
would be happy to give up the deduction for business travel.8 Similarly, the goal 
might be to find a married taxpayer who would reenter the workforce after having 
children only in the absence of tax distortions.9 The challenge is to identify groups 
of taxpayers who can be expected, on average, to pay at least as much tax in the 
alternative tax regime. 
Artificial intelligence (“AI”) may now make it possible in many cases to 
identify such taxpayers. Three revolutions—in computing power, in the availability 
of data, and in the computer algorithms used to analyze the data10—mean that 
computers can increasingly predict human behavior with remarkable accuracy.11 As 
early as 2011, the retailer Target Corp. famously sent coupons for baby clothes and 
cribs to a teenager, whom its data scientists had predicted was pregnant.12 The 
teenager’s father came to a Target store furious about the mailing, but later 
apologized when he found out that his daughter was in fact pregnant.13 Since 2011, 
artificial intelligence has grown ever more capable, and today, such anecdotes seem 
unsurprising. Legal scholars take as granted that algorithms can make reasonably 
accurate predictions, focusing instead on questions of when and how the legal 
system should be able to rely on them.14  
Even the best analysis will not provide foolproof predictions about how 
different taxpayers will respond to alternative tax regimes. But tax law already 
relies on predictive analytics. In the United States, the IRS has long used data-
driven computer models to determine the most promising audit targets ex post.15 
                                                 
8
 See Section I.A.1.  
9
 See Section I.A.2.  
10
 A notable advance has been the deep neural network. See Geoffrey E. Hinton, Learning Multiple Layers of 
Representation, 11 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 428 (2007).  
11
 See, e.g., Steve Lohr, The A.I. Wave Is Here, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 2018, at F7; Carlos E. Perez, The Uncanny 
Intuition of Deep Learning to Predict Human Behavior, Jan. 12, 2017, 
https://medium.com/intuitionmachine/deep-learning-to-predict-human-behavior-a2cd2ce14132. See generally 
CHRISTOPHER M. BISHOP, PATTERN RECOGNITION AND MACHINE LEARNING (2011) (describing the various 
methods of computer-based prediction).  
12
 Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30.  
13
 Id.  
14
 See, e.g., Judge Noel L. Hillman, The Use of Artificial Intelligence in Gauging the Risk of Recidivism, 58 
JUDGES J. 36 (2019) (arguing that use of AI in sentencing may violate due process even if it is accurate); Sonia 
K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54 (2019) (arguing a 
variety of legal tools to reduce the opacity of artificial intelligence); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, 
The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014) (urging those affected 
adversely by predictions be given due process rights to challenge them).  
15
 The IRS has a highly confidential statistical methodology called the Discriminant Index Function (DIF) that 
scores the likelihood of an audit that increases tax revenue; the higher the DIF score, the greater the probability 
of being audited. IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 4.1.3.2. The IRS also uses totally random audits to 




But tax law has never used AI or other data-driven models to optimize or target tax 
rules ex ante, either to improve efficiency or to maximize tax revenues.16 Tax 
scholars have ignored the possibility of optimizing tax law using data science.17 
Perhaps the reason for this gap in the literature is justifiable fear that 
government empowered to use AI to change individual tax regimes might make 
serious errors or, more nefariously, favor some taxpayers and discriminate against 
others. But this Article proposes alternative regimes entered into through voluntary 
private contractual arrangements. Such an approach not only reduces the danger of 
governmental abuse but also ensures that private parties have robust incentives to 
identify areas in which available data allows sufficiently confident predictions. 
Contractual tax reform would require careful implementation.18 Private 
intermediaries would design alternative tax regimes and decide which taxpayers to 
invite. These private intermediaries must have proper incentives to identify regimes 
that improve taxpayer utility while producing at least as much tax revenues to the 
government. Our proposal provides these incentives by randomly assigning some 
taxpayers who would like to be subject to an alternative regime to a control group 
subject to generally applicable tax law. This group’s tax receipts would determine 
how much the intermediary must pay to the government. The design ensures that 
the arrangement will not harm the government, and the requirement that taxpayers 
affirmatively opt in ensures that taxpayers expect it to benefit them. It might seem 
that the only losers are the taxpayers stuck in the status quo by random chance, yet 
this Article will demonstrate how these taxpayers can benefit too.19 
                                                 
improve the data used in the DIF. Id. § 4.22.1.5(5). Scholars have discussed using AI to model tax avoidance 
and ways to catch avoiders, again, ex post. E.g. Erik Hemberg et al., Tax Non-Compliance Detection Using Co-
Evolution of Tax Evasion Risk and Audit Likelihood in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 
ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW 79 (2015).  
16
 Indeed, it is doubtful whether the IRS has the expertise or capacity to optimize tax law ex ante using artificial 
intelligence. 1 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, OBJECTIVE REPORTS TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 123 
(2016), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/reports/fy-2017-objectives-report-to-congress/full-report (noting that 
the IRS uses “data mining models,” amongst other techniques, to stop refunds on potentially false returns, but 
has an unacceptably high rate of false positives); see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., REVIEW 
OF THE ELECTRONIC FRAUD DETECTION SYSTEM (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/201520093fr.html (discussing the poor state of the 
IRS’s technology). 
17
 The apparently sole exception is Christian Baker et al., A Big Data Approach to Optimal Sales Taxation 
(NBER Working Paper No. 20130, May 2014), and that paper deals only with sales tax, not income tax or 
corporate tax.  
18
 Contractual tax reform involves experimentation using real-world conditions, which is in stark contrast to 
the laboratory-based experimentation into individuals’ behavior that is common in areas including taxation. 
For a good review of laboratory-based experimentation, see James Alm & Sarah Jacobson, Using Laboratory 
Experiments in Public Economics, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 129 (2007).  
19
 See infra text accompanying note 243. 




Suppose, for example, that a private intermediary called “Taxes, Inc.” hires 
tax experts and AI experts to collaborate. The firm identifies one million candidate 
taxpayers to invite to opt into an alternative tax regime. Taxes, Inc. would send 
these taxpayers an invitation to opt in, along with disclosures about the upsides and 
downsides of the alternative regime.20 Suppose that 100,000 of the invitees agree to 
participate and are deemed suitable candidates after further voluntary disclosures 
to Taxes, Inc. A randomly selected subset of these opting-in taxpayers (say, 10%, 
meaning 10,000 taxpayers) would be assigned at random to the control group. But 
the other 90,000 would be bound by the alternative tax regime; the alternative tax 
regime would be a contract between them and Taxes, Inc. If the 90,000 taxpayers—
the “treatment group”—paid more than 9.0 times the taxes paid by the control 
group, then Taxes, Inc., would receive the excess (or some fraction thereof) as 
profits. But if the treatment group paid less than 9.0 times the taxes paid by the 
control group, Taxes, Inc., would have to reimburse the government the difference 
(or the same fraction thereof).21 
Private intermediaries could offer alternative tax regimes to individuals or 
to business entities like corporations.22 The alternative tax regimes could be purely 
substantive, purely procedural, or a combination of both.  Some limitations on 
alternative tax regimes are desirable. Many tax benefits aim to achieve non-tax 
policy goals.23 For example, the research and development (R&D) tax credit24 
encourages scientific and engineering expenditures. The underlying theory is that 
businesses do not capture all the benefits of their R&D expenses,25 and so society 
                                                 
20
 Regarding disclosures to avoid exploitation, see infra Section II.C.1.  
21
 Mathematical formulas other than fractions of the difference in collection are possible. The only constraint 
in designing the formulas for what Taxes, Inc. receives for increased collections (or what Taxes, Inc. pays for 
shortfalls) is that they must give Taxes, Inc. incentives to design alternative tax regimes that have an expected 
value greater than the expected value of the status quo.  
22
 C corporations and certain types of trusts are examples of business entities that pay taxes. I.R.C. § 11 
(imposing tax on C corporations); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (deeming a number of types of business entities 
to be corporations); cf. I.R.C. § 641(a) (imposing tax on trusts). Other business entities, like partnerships and 
S corporations, are not taxpaying entities, but rather “pass through” their income and other tax attributes to 
their partners, shareholder, or other owners. I.R.C. § 701 (“A partnership as such shall not be subject to the 
income tax imposed by this chapter. Persons carrying on business as partners shall be liable for income tax 
only in their separate or individual capacities.”); id. § 1363(a) (“[A]n S corporation shall not be subject to the 
taxes imposed by this chapter”).  
23
 See generally Borris Bittker, Accounting for Federal “Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX 
J. 244 (1969); Cliff Fleming & Robert Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced from a Normative 
Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and Its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135 (2010). 
24
 I.R.C. § 41; see also id. § 174 (allowing immediate deduction for R&D expenditures, in 
contravention of the general principle of capitalization for expenditures creating multi-year 
benefits). 
25
 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 112TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND 
MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 104 (Comm. Print 112-45, 2012) (“[B]usinesses in general 




benefits from favorable tax treatment of R&D.26 Similarly, many other tax 
expenditures aim to encourage taxpayers to create positive externalities or to reduce 
negative externalities. Examples include various tax benefits for higher education,27 
clean energy,28 and homeownership.29 The simplest solution is for Congress simply 
to bar alternative regimes that remove specified tax benefits or, particularly in early 
implementations, to limit the scope of contractual tax reform to specific 
provisions.30 Blocking some tax benefits will, of course, be less of an issue in 
countries (or states) that make less use of tax benefits to further non-tax policy 
goals.31 Though most of our examples will focus on the U.S. federal tax system 
because of its familiarity, contractual tax reform might be as or more desirable in 
other jurisdictions. 
There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that welfare-improving 
alternative tax regimes exist even in the U.S. federal tax system. This system is 
extraordinarily expensive to comply with and to administer,32 yet it leaves hundreds 
of billions of dollars owed to the government uncollected.33 And it creates massive 
economic distortions. These administrative costs and inefficiencies are potential 
gains that can be distributed among taxpayers, the government, and intermediaries, 
so long as an intermediary is able to target its offers sufficiently well.  
Tax rate schedules will often be a source of beneficial exchanges, because 
the status quo balances two irreconcilable goals.34 The first goal, based on 
conceptions of equity, is progressivity.35 Progressivity demands that higher-earners 
should pay not merely higher tax than lower earners, but a higher percentage of 
                                                 
are unlikely to invest in R&D in amounts consistent with its social returns.”). 
26
 Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Can a Patent Box Promote Advanced Manufacturing?, 
147 TAX NOTES 1347, 1347 (June 22, 2015) (“decades of research by leading economists indicates 
that externalities from R&D not only exist but are very large”). 
27
 I.R.C. § 25A. 
28
 Id. §§ 45, 136, 179D 
29
 Id. § 163(h). 
30
 A drawback is that this may limit the most creative alternative regimes, such as those that do not 
even use the concept of deductions. See, e.g., infra note 140 and accompanying text.  
31
 Countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and South Korea have much lower levels of tax 
expenditures than the United States. See JOE MINARIK, TAX EXPENDITURES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
28 (2009), http://www.oecd.org/governance/budgeting/42976288.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2019). 
32
 See Section I.C.1.  
33
 See Section I.C.2.  
34
 See Section I.B (giving examples of such exchanges based on tax rate schedules).  
35
 See BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS ¶ 3.4 
(1999 & Supp. 2016)  




their earnings.36 As a result, the marginal tax rate a taxpayer pays (that is, the tax 
on the last dollar of income) should be higher than the inframarginal rates (that is, 
tax on lower dollars of income). The second goal, based on efficiency concerns, is 
to minimize distortions from tax.37 Inframarginal tax rates are less likely to affect 
taxpayers’ behavior than marginal rates, because each additional dollar of income 
contributes less to utility than the prior dollar and because a unit of leisure time is 
more valuable when there is less of it.38 Efficiency thus counsels toward low 
marginal rates, even at the expense of higher inframarginal rates. Indeed, the least 
distortionary tax is a lump sum tax with a zero marginal rate.39 Thus, the dilemma: 
Progressivity requires that marginal rates increase with income; efficiency is best 
served by lump sum taxation or low marginal rates.  
These two goals are irreconcilable only if the same tax rate schedule applies 
to all taxpayers.40 Contractual tax reform allows tailoring tax rate schedules to 
taxpayers’ characteristics and preferences, enabling both progressivity and 
efficiency.41 Tax schedules with relatively high inframarginal rates and low 
marginal rates are possible under contractual tax reforms targeted to taxpayers’ 
circumstances. If AI makes possible identification of those who would accept such 
alternative schedules and yet could expect to pay at least as much under them, then 
contractual tax reform can offer substantial benefits to both the government and 
taxpayers.42 Even if intermediaries can make confident predictions only that a small 
set of taxpayers, such as taxpayers subject to an especially inefficient deduction, 
                                                 
36
 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 3.5.3; Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for 
Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); Sarah Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility 
and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. REV. 904 (2011). 
37
 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) (noting that taxes may reduce efficiency by 
distorting work choices). 
38
 Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 1905, 1947 (1987) (noting that “consumption and leisure have declining marginal utility”). Someone who 
is on the margin of whether to work (and thus be a taxpayer) at all, however, may be sensitive to the tax rate 
charged on the first dollars earned. See generally Emmanuel Saez, Optimal Income Transfer Programs: 
Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses, 2002 Q.J. ECON. 1039 (2002) (noting that the optimal 
choice between or combination of Negative Income Tax and Earned Income Tax Credit programs depends on 
behavioral responses at both the extensive margin, i.e., whether to work at all, and intensive margin, i.e., how 
much to work). The existence of heterogeneity in behavioral responses enhances our broader argument for 
allowing alternative tax regimes adapted to individual characteristics.  
39
 BOADWAY, supra note 6, at 71; id. at 143; id. at 182 (noting that lack of government information is reason 
we do not have lump-sum taxes); accord Joseph E. Stiglitz, Self-Selection and Pareto Efficient Taxation, 17 J. 
PUB. ECON. 213, 217 (1982) (analyzing lump-sum only taxation as the “first-best optimum” policy).  
40
 See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d).  
41
 For an extensive discussion of relaxing the single-rate-schedule approach, see infra Section I.B.  
42
 See infra Sections I.B.1 & I.B.2 (discussing how such separation are possible).  




would benefit from an alternative tax regime while still paying higher taxes, the 
benefits could be substantial for those taxpayers. 
If contractual tax reform were sufficiently widespread, it might have broad 
benefits beyond those who opt into alternative tax regimes. Congress, the IRS, and 
scholars may learn from the success or failure of alternative tax regimes.43 
Contractual tax reform might support experimentation with tax reform goals 
previously thought to require universally applicable tax changes, such as moves to 
mark-to-market taxation of securities in exchange for lower rates44 or replacement 
of corporate taxes by government holdings of nonvoting corporate stock.45   
The prior literature has considered the possibility that the government might 
improve policy with randomized experiments in a variety of areas,46 including tax 
law.47 Other scholars, meanwhile, have proposed allowing private parties to opt out 
of default economic regulation in areas such as securities law48 and bankruptcy,49 
and a recent article suggests that corporations be allowed to appoint private firms 
to serve the function of directors.50 But the literature on government 
experimentation has ignored the literature on opting out of regulation and vice 
                                                 
43
 Indeed, if contractual tax reform became common, the tax code in Title 26 of the U.S. Code might 
come to be seen as a “penalty default rule.” Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). Lawmakers might be more 
willing to enact cumbersome tax provisions if they know that affected taxpayers can contract around 
it with alternative tax regimes that lack those provisions 
44
 “Mark-to-market” means that the securities (or other assets) are treated as if sold at the end of the year for 
their fair market value. See David A. Weisbach, A Partial Mark-to-Market Tax System, 53 TAX L. REV. 95 
(1999) (proposing a generalized version of this alternative regime, with different rates for assets like securities 
marked-to-market than for assets not marked-to-market). But see Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income 
Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism, and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 861 (1997) (arguing 
against any mark-to-market system).  
45
 See infra Section I.D (discussing this option).  
46
 See, e.g., Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy, 28 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 38 (2015) (consumer protection law); Zachary J. Gubler, Making Experimental Rules 
Work, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 558 (2015) (securities law); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 
101 VA. L. REV. 65, 65 (2015) (patent law); Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of 
Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1152-68 (2018) (agricultural policy) 
47
 See Michael Abramowicz, Tax Experimentation, 71 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (on file with author). 
48
 See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 
2359 (1998) (urging adoption of a federalist model of securities regulation modeled on the federalist system of 
corporate governance). 
49
 See Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807 (1998) 
(arguing that requiring firms to use a particular bankruptcy system increases the borrowing firm’s cost of 
capital). 
50
 Stephen M. Bainbridge & M. Todd Henderson, Boards-R-Us: Reconceptualizing Corporate Boards, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 1051 (2014). 




versa. The possibility that private parties might facilitate contracting around default 
tax law has received no prior consideration. 
Perhaps the closest suggestion is Saul Levmore’s proposal to “allow every 
wealthy individual, at age sixty for example, to choose among revenue-neutral 
combinations of income and estate tax rates.”51 Levmore does not explore the more 
general question of how the government or private parties might identify alternative 
tax regimes to apply to particular taxpayers. Meanwhile, Anthony Casey and 
Anthony Niblett argue that developments in AI anticipate the increasing ability of 
the government to fashion “micro-directives” responsive to circumstances, 
combining the predictability of rules with the flexibility of standards,52 and they 
offer a brief application to tax law.53 But their ambition is for the law to take into 
account diverse circumstances itself; they do not consider the possibility that 
private parties might identify citizens who then may opt into particular alternative 
legal rules.  
We are not the first to consider allowing nongovernmental entities to create 
tax policy in some way, however. The economist Erzo Luttmer proposed a 
mechanism in which profit-maximizing firms redistribute income.54 The 
government would assign employees at random to employers, each receiving the 
same base salary.55 An employee may then enter into an agreement to work with 
the employer, or can work for a third party and give the assigned employer a 
government-set fraction of the amount earned.56 The lower this fraction, the greater 
the an incentive to offer an attractive base salary, thus encouraging intrafirm income 
redistribution. Luttmer’s proposal is impractical.57 Assigning employees at random 
to employers is inconsistent with foundational commitments of liberal democracy. 
Nonetheless, Luttmer’s proposal underscores that properly incentivized private 
parties may be better situated than the government to assess individuals’ abilities 
and thus to better offer them tax schedules.58 Our project similarly seeks to take 
                                                 
51
 Saul Levmore, From Helmets to Savings and Inheritance Taxes: Regulatory Intensity, Information 
Revelation, and Internalities, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 229, 247 (2014) (emphasis added).  
52
 Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards (U. Chi. Pub. L. Working Paper 
No. 55, Nov. 20, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693826.  
53
 Casey and Nisblett consider a tax authority using artificial intelligence “to provide advance tax rulings,” 
indicating how the law would apply to particular individuals. Id. at 22.  
54
 Erzo F.P. Luttmer, Can Income Redistribution Be Privatized? (NBER Draft, 2001), 
http://www.nber.org/~luttmer/privatize.pdf.  
55
 Id. at 5. 
56
 Id.  
57
 Id. at 8 (“To make privatized redistribution feasible, many practical issues would need to be addressed 
including opportunities for employment changes, bankruptcy, retirement rules and the age at which individuals 
are matched to firms.”).  
58
 Id. at 7 (noting that this system gives employers “incentives to improve their assessments of workers’ 




advantage of private information, but to allow taxpayers and private tax 
intermediaries to freely choose one another. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers several examples of alternative 
tax regimes that private intermediaries might offer to taxpayers. These examples 
highlight inefficiencies from current one-size-fits-all tax law. Part II explores the 
mechanics of how private intermediaries could offer alternative regimes to 
taxpayers. It explains the responsibilities of intermediaries and how the government 
can ensure that they will be able to pay their bills, and it also describes how the 
government might prevent various manipulations, such as shifting income between 
periods or changing tax filing status, and deal with complications such as tax 
expenditures. Part III considers potential objections. Reliance on private 
intermediaries necessitates some regulation to prevent financial or privacy abuses, 
similar to existing financial and privacy regulation. Properly implemented, 
contractual tax reform need not worsen inequality or horizontal inequity and in fact 
could help reduce these problems. A brief conclusion follows.  
I. APPLICATIONS 
The goal of this Article’s proposal is for some taxpayers to receive the 
option of an alternative tax regime expected to leave the taxpayers better off and 
increase the tax revenue received by the government (or at least keep tax revenues 
constant). This Part will describe some hypothetical alternative regimes, while the 
next Part explains the mechanisms of contractual tax reform. 
A. Changing the Tax Base 
In the U.S. income tax system, the “tax base” is taxable income: the 
taxpayer’s gross income minus the taxpayer’s deductions.59 Any change to tax—
whether it be traditional tax reform or contractual tax reform—can expand the tax 
base by expanding the definition of what is in gross income60 or by reducing the 
available deductions.61 Conversely, a change to tax law can contract the tax base, 
such as by offering a new deduction. Alternative tax regimes offered by private 
                                                 
abilities”). What Luttmer refers to as “incentive schedules” from assigned employers are economically the 
same as tax schedules.  
59
 I.R.C. §§ 1, 11, 63(a).  
60
 The most obvious way to expand gross income is to contract the “exclusions” from gross income, which are 
“a receipt or accrual that would, but for a specific exclusion provided by the Code or administrative action, be 
included in a taxpayer's gross income.” WARREN, GORHAM & LAMONT, TAX DICTIONARY (2019 ed.). I.R.C. 
sections 101 through 127 contain express exclusions.  
61
 Expanding the tax base is a commonly touted element of tax reform. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON 
TAX’N, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 6–11 (1987).  




intermediaries could offer expansions, contractions, or both, with the goal of 
increasing overall tax revenues while still leaving the taxpayer better off. 
1. Expanding the Base 
Consider businesspeople A and B, who both have gross income of $140,000 
and spend $40,000 per year on business travel to visit clients.62 Assume for 
simplicity that both are subject to a flat 50% tax rate on all their taxable income.63 
Although they appear identical, their business travel activities differ substantially: 
A loves sightseeing, whereas B only conducts business. A’s $40,000 spent on 
business travel generates merely $10,000 in gross income, but brings $20,000 worth 
of personal utility, because the travel allows A to sightsee between business 
meetings.64 It seems irrational for A to spend $40,000 on business travel that brings 
in only $10,000 in profits and $20,000 in personal utility. But current tax law makes 
such wasteful behavior entirely rational,65 since A can deduct the $40,000 in travel 
expenses,66 reducing A’s tax bill by $20,000.67 A’s distorted behavior has cost the 
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 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses . . . 
including . . . traveling expenses . . . while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business”).  
63
 This rate is a simplification and is higher than the rates one would expect under current law, where top federal 
marginal tax rates are 39.6%, I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d). State tax rates, however, can add as much as 12.3%. CAL. REV. 
& TAX. CODE § 17041.  
64
 See generally William A. Klein, The Deductibility of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business 
and Pleasure Trip—A Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REV. 1099 (1966) (analyzing the problem of 
deductibility of business travel that creates personal utility).  
65
 With respect to A, the costs of the business trip are $40,000 in actual expenses, plus the $5,000 in taxes paid 
on the $10,000 in gross income generated by the travel. The total costs to A are thus $45,000. Meanwhile, A’s 
benefits from the business trip are the $20,000 in personal enjoyment, plus $20,000 in taxes saved because the 
business expenses are deductible, plus $10,000 in gross income. Thus A’s benefits of $50,000 exceed A’s 
$45,000 in costs. A’s surplus from the travel is the difference, $5,000.  
66
 In theory, a deduction for business travel can be denied if the personal-consumption aspect is egregiously 
large compared to the bona fide business motivations. But courts give taxpayers a wide berth on such matters. 
See Palo Alto Town & Country Village, Inc. v. Commissioner, 565 F.2d 1388, 1390–91 (9th Cir. 1977) 
(allowing lavish travel expense deduction upon showing that it was helpful in one instance to the taxpayer); 
Henry v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 879, 884 (1961) (“In determining that which is ‘necessary’ to a taxpayer’s 
trade or business, the taxpayer is ordinarily the best judge on the matter, and we would hesitate to substitute 
our own discretion for his”). A’s sightseeing expenses would not be deductible since they are clearly personal 
expenses. I.R.C. § 262. Whether the overall trip is treated as a deductible business trip or a personal trip is 
based on the facts and circumstances, with weight given to factors as time spent on business versus personal 
activities, not the amount of gross income earned from the trip. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b).  
67
 We assumed for simplicity a 50% tax rate. A deduction of $40,000 for someone with a 50% tax rate results 
in tax savings of 50% times $40,000, which equals $20,000.  




government $15,000 in lost tax revenue68 and made society as a whole $10,000 
poorer.69 
B’s business travel, by contrast, is all about business. By travelling, B earns 
$50,000 in additional income from clients, but zero personal utility. B’s after-tax 
benefit of the travel is $25,000, i.e., the additional $50,000 in income from clients, 
reduced by the 50% tax rate. B would not travel for business without the 
deductibility of travel expenses, because the $40,000 expense is greater than this 
$25,000. With deductibility, the $40,000 in travel expenses has an after-tax cost of 
only $20,000. B comes out $5,000 ahead by taking the travel, while the government 
collects an additional $5,000 in tax revenue. The deductibility of B’s travel 
expenses thus increases social efficiency by $10,000. Such behavior explains why 
the tax code currently allows deducting business travel. 
Allowing B to deduct business expenses makes society better off, while 
allowing A the same deduction does the opposite. Under current law, the 
government makes no effort to distinguish between A and B.70 Indeed, the 
government currently has no way to observe that A enjoys $20,000 worth of 
personal utility from the travel (from sightseeing), or to observe that B’s business 
travel is all about business. The government also has no way to observe that A earns 
merely $10,000 in income from clients by travelling, whereas B earns $50,000. 
Contractual tax reform can address this problem. Private intermediaries 
could offer both A and B an alternative tax regime, structured so that only those 
taxpayers who inefficiently take advantage of travel deductions would opt in. For 
example, both A and B could be offered an alternative tax regime where business 
travel expenses are not deductible, in exchange for lowering the tax rate from 50% 
to 45%. (Recall that to keep the math simple, we have assumed flat tax rates.) 
Simple cost-benefit analysis shows that A will accept this alternative regime and 
forgo all business travel,71 increasing A’s personal utility, increasing tax revenues, 
and increasing overall social well-being. Meanwhile, B will not opt-in, thus sticking 
with current law, also a socially efficient result.72 
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 The travel resulted in gross income of $10,000 and a deduction of $40,000, for a decrease in taxable income 
of $30,000. At the 50% tax rate, the government has lost $15,000 in tax revenue.  
69
 As shown supra note 65, A’s net benefit from the travel expenses is $5,000, and as shown supra note 67, the 
government lost $15,000 in tax revenue. The $10,000 is the deadweight loss to society.  
70
 See authorities supra note 66.  
71
 Under current law, when A takes the deductible travel, A has gross income of $140,000, $40,000 in deductible 
travel expenses, leading to taxable income of $100,000 and after-tax income of $50,000. Adding in the $20,000 
in personal utility from the travel, A has total utility of $70,000. But by opting for the alternative regime and 
not taking the business travel, A will have gross income of $130,000, no deductions (since A no longer travels), 
and thus taxable income of $130,000. The alternative regime provides a 45% rate, leaving 55% of A’s income 
available after taxes. 55% of $130,000 is $71,500, which is $1,500 greater than A’s utility under current law.  
72
 Meanwhile, under current law, when B takes the deductible travel, B has taxable income of $100,000 (i.e., 




Crucially, under the alternative regime, the taxes collected from A will 
increase by $8,500.73 Although the alternative regime lowers the tax rate from 50% 
to 45%, taking away the deduction for business travel – a form of broadening the 
tax base – more than makes up for the lowered tax rate. This $8,500 in additional 
tax revenue would likely more than cover any costs of administering the alternative 
tax regime. Some portion of the $8,500 would go to the private tax intermediary, 
with the remainder going into government coffers.  
Of course, not every taxpayer should have the opportunity to opt into this 
alternative tax regime. Consider a taxpayer C, who never takes business travel. C 
will happily give up the right to deduct travel expenses, in exchange for tax rates 
reduced from 50% to 45%. But for C, this alternative tax regime would be a pure 
windfall, providing lower taxes but zero social benefit. The private intermediaries 
must not only design good alternative regimes, but also invite only taxpayers who, 
if they opt in, are likely to increase both tax collections and social welfare. 
The most straightforward approach is likely for the private intermediary to 
consider past travel expenses, offering the alternative tax regime only to those 
taxpayers who have taken substantial travel-expense deductions in prior years.74 
But private intermediaries could feed much more sophisticated, detailed, useful 
data to their AI. For example, taxpayers who use their credit card on business trips 
to pay for museum admission fees or sightseeing tours likely receive higher 
personal utility from business travel. Moreover, since someone who takes lots of 
for-pleasure travel presumably also gains more utility from business travel, data on 
                                                 
$140,000 gross income minus $40,000 deductible travel expenses), leading to after-tax income of $50,000. B 
has no additional personal utility from the travel. If B is subject to the alternative regime and nonetheless still 
takes the travel, then B will have taxable income of $140,000, which, with the 45% alternative tax rate, leaves 
$77,000 after taxes. Subtracting the $40,000 in travel expenses, which would not be deductible under the 
alternative regime, B is left with only $37,000, which is much worse than the $50,000 under current law. 
Meanwhile, if B takes the alternative regime and does not take the travel, then B will have gross income of just 
$90,000, since B will lose $50,000 in gross income from clients by not travelling. With the 45% alternative tax 
rate, that leaves $49,500, which is less than the $50,000 under the current law. Thus, B will not opt for the 
alternative regime.  
73
 Under current law, A took and deducted the business travel, resulting in taxable income of 
$100,000 and taxes collected of $50,000 at the 50% rate. But under the alternative regime, A will not take the 
business travel, and thus will lose $10,000 in gross income from clients, but will end up with taxable income 
of $130,000. At the 45% rate, that results in $58,500 in taxes collected, which is $8,500 greater than the $50,000 
under current law.  
74
 More sophisticated methods of deciding whom to invite to opt in would likely have substantial benefits. 
Suppose that taxpayer D has the same observable characteristics as A and B, with business travel expenses of 
$40,000 and gross income of $140,000. But suppose that D has already made plans to switch from travelling 
to meet clients in person to using teleconferencing to conduct the same meetings. D would happily opt-into the 
alternative tax regime, producing a windfall to D at the expense of tax revenues. Artificial intelligence can help 
predict which taxpayers likely would change their behavior without the alternative tax regime. Companies that 
market teleconferencing services make use of AI to predict who is most likely to buy their services in lieu of 
business travel, and a private tax intermediary should be able to identify the same taxpayers also using AI.  




for-pleasure travel patterns also might give some indication of a taxpayer’s personal 
utility from business trips. The higher the personal utility a taxpayer receives from 
business travel, the more likely that the deductibility of business travel is creating 
distortions, as with the example of taxpayer A. It thus likely makes more sense—
both in terms of additional tax revenue and social welfare—for a private 
intermediary to offer the alternative tax regime to such taxpayers.  
Of course, existing data cannot provide a final answer to questions of which 
taxpayers should receive the option of the alternative tax regime. Actual 
experimentation in the real world by private intermediaries would generate 
experience and additional data.  
2. Contracting the Base 
Scholars have long recognized that tax law hinders gender equality by 
discouraging mothers from staying in (or reentering) the workforce.75 Consider a 
woman who earns $30,000 per year and has a husband who earns a great deal more 
than that. Suppose that the marginal tax rate applicable to all of the wife’s taxable 
income is 50%.76 The couple then has children. The woman faces a decision: stop 
working to care for the children77 or continue working but pay $20,000 per year for 
childcare. Childcare expenses are not deductible,78 so the after-tax benefit of 
continuing to work is $15,000, which is $5,000 less than the cost of childcare. 
Assuming that she acts solely based on present economic considerations and 
receives no utility (or disutility) from work, the woman will rationally stop 
working. This is inefficient. Society loses $10,000 because the wife is no longer 
contributing $30,000 worth of labor, which would cost only $20,000 in childcare. 
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 See Shannon Weeks McCormack, Postpartum Taxation and the Squeezed Out Mom, 105 GEO. L.J. 1323 
(2017) (discussing problem and suggesting solutions).  
76
 In most marriages, the two spouses file a joint return. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 111.5.2. With 
joint returns, the lower earner pays higher marginal tax rates than the low earner would pay if single. Id. Thus 
the application of the assumed top marginal rate to the wife’s taxable income in this example is not unrealistic, 
despite her low gross income. Of course, the problem exists even with lower marginal rates, with a 
concomitantly smaller tax distortion. 
77
 Care provided by a taxpayer to his or her own children in the home is not taxed. It is the paradigmatic 
example of untaxed “imputed income” under longstanding U.S. income tax principles. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, 
supra note 35, ¶ 5.3.2.  
78
 I.R.C. § 262(a) (“Except as otherwise expressly provided … no deduction shall be allowed for personal, 
living, or family expenses.”); Smith v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 1038 (1939); cf. Shannon Weeks McCormack, 
Overtaxing the Working Family: Uncle Sam and the Childcare Squeeze, 114 MICH. L. REV. 559 (2016) (arguing 
for allowing deductibility). Congress has provided a meager dependent-care tax credit worth only $600 per 
year in this situation. I.R.C. § 21; see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 35, ¶ 37.2.2. Alternatively, taxpayers 
whose employers provide a dependent-care flexible spending account can exclude up to $5,000 in childcare 
expenses. See I.R.C. § 129 (excluding employer-provided dependent-care assistance); I.R.C. § 125 (authorizing 
flexible spending accounts).  




Government, society, and the couple would all benefit from making their childcare 
deductible, which would change her after-tax benefit of continuing to work to 
$25,000,79 which exceeds the $20,000 cost of childcare.  
Why then does the tax code not already allow a deduction for childcare 
expenses? Because many mothers work and pay for childcare without a deduction. 
Allowing such mothers to deduct childcare would give them a tax windfall. For 
example, suppose that the mother in the example above was earning $50,000 rather 
than $30,000. She might then rationally continue working even without childcare 
being deductible.80 Allowing her to deduct childcare would result in a tax windfall 
of $10,000, without furthering either economic efficiency or gender equity. As 
another example, suppose once again that the mother earned only $30,000, but that 
she received non-monetary personal satisfaction worth $6,000 from going to work 
and getting out of the house. That benefit would cause the mother to continue 
working, even without childcare being deductible.81 For this taxpayer, a deduction 
for childcare would also result in a tax windfall. 
Contractual tax reform can solve this problem. Private intermediaries 
should offer the alternative tax regime, where childcare is deductible, only to 
married taxpayers for whom the deduction seems likely to make the difference 
between both spouses continuing to work or not. Even without extensive computing 
power and AI, a private intermediary might be able to identify such taxpayers by 
looking only at both spouses’ pre-child income, the couple’s marginal tax rate, and 
the cost of childcare near the taxpayers. But, using AI, private intermediaries might 
target the invitations to opt in even more precisely, projecting income potential.82 
Moreover, AI could even be used to estimate the noneconomic utility (or disutility) 
the mother would receive from getting out of the house to go to work, just as 
marketers use AI to aim products and services at new mothers.  
Antidiscrimination concerns might limit the variables that an artificial 
intelligence model could incorporate. The sex of each member of the couple 
(including whether the couple is same-sex) may be highly predictive,83 but there are 
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 The wife would earn $30,000 in additional gross income, but the couple could deduct the $20,000 in childcare 
costs, resulting in additional taxable income of just $10,000. The couple would pay $5,000 in taxes on the 
$30,000 in earnings, leaving $25,000 in after-tax benefit.  
80
 In this example, the after-tax benefit to the mother of continuing to work is $25,000, which is the earnings 
of $50,000 minus the 50% in taxes. The cost of continuing to work is $20,000, the cost of the childcare. Thus, 
the mother will have $5,000 to spend after paying for childcare. 
81
 In this example, the after-tax benefit of continuing to work is $21,000, i.e., the $15,000 income after taxes 
plus the $6,000 in noneconomic personal utility from working. The $20,000 cost of childcare is less than this.  
82
 See discussion infra note 113 and accompanying text (noting data-based predictions of income).  
83
 D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, AFTER DECADES OF DECLINE, A RISE IN STAY-AT-HOME 
MOTHERS 29 (2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2014/04/Moms-At-Home_04-08-2014.pdf 
(presenting survey data showing that mothers are much more likely than fathers to stop working, take 




arguments against considering sex. A regime that results in more tax rate reductions 
for women, even if motivated by the good intention of increasing gender-equality 
in the workforce, would reinforce the stereotype that women prefer caring for 
children, and thus need inducements to work outside the home.84 The possibility 
that AI might perpetuate discrimination has received great attention recently,85 and 
this concern may be so weighty that some strategies offered by private 
intermediaries should be prohibited. Such concerns are a fertile area for future 
scholars.  
Beyond childcare, private intermediaries offering alternative tax regimes 
could improve efficiency by granting other deductions or exclusions that entice 
taxpayers into the workforce or into accepting higher-paying jobs. Some possible 
examples among many include targeted deductions for home-office expenses,86 the 
cost of work clothing,87 and commuting expenses.88 Such expenses are often not 
currently deductible, under the theory that these expenses are usually mostly 
personal, but that may vary across taxpayers and expenses. The tax code seeks to 
accommodate this, sometimes allowing partial deductibility89 and at other times 
making fine distinctions about what is personal and what is not.90 But private 
intermediaries might account for individual circumstances, such as the importance 
of clothing to particular jobs or the availability of housing near a workplace. 
Alternative tax regimes, meanwhile, need not make a binary decision between 
allowing a deduction and disallowing it. Rather, an alternative tax regime might 
                                                 
significant time off, or reduce their work hours to care for children), .  
84
 See Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729–34 (2003) (criticizing parental-leave policies 
that privileged maternity leave as reinforcing gender stereotypes).  
85
 E.g., JULIA ANGWIN ET AL., PROPUBLICA, MACHINE BIAS (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing; Kate Crawford, 
Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, NY TIMES, June 26, 2016, at SR11.  
86
 See I.R.C. § 280A(c)(1) (allowing deductions for limited home office expenses). For example, a lawyer who 
has children might be enticed to continue practicing by allowing deductions relating to adding and maintaining 
an alcove in an existing children’s playroom as a home office, which would not currently be deductible. Id. 
(requiring that use be “exclusive”).  
87
 See Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980) (disallowing deductions for employee purchases 
of job-required clothing in just about all situations).  
88
 See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1945) (based on predecessor to I.R.C. § 262 denying deduction 
for personal, family, and living expenses). Similarly, consider a taxpayer who has a more promising job in 
another state, but who is held back from moving due to negative home equity in her house. There could be an 
exclusion from such a taxpayer’s gross income when the new employer repays the taxpayer’s negative home 
equity, which currently is not excludable. See I.R.C. §§ 217(b) & 132(a)(6) & (g).  
89
 I.R.C. § 274(n) (allowing deduction for only 50% of most business meal expenses).  
90
 Compare Pevsner v. Commissioner, 628 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1980) (deductibility of cost of clothing worn to 
work determined based on objective standards), with Bernardo v. Commissioner, 88 T.C.M. (CCH) 191 (2004) 
(using subjective standards for same).  




result in partial deductibility of certain expenses,91 in exchange for a small increase 
in tax rates.  
B. Accommodating Other Sources of Heterogeneity 
The previous section discussed how private intermediaries might offer 
alternative tax regimes that change the tax base to accommodate taxpayer’s diverse 
situations, such as preferences for business travel or for working outside the home. 
This section considers alternative tax regimes that accommodate diverse taxpayer 
preferences in more radical ways than just changing the tax base. Specifically, this 
section addresses two common sources of taxpayer diversity: differences in 
earnings potential and differences in preferences for work versus leisure. As in the 
previous Section, the alternative tax regimes should aim to increase the taxpayers’ 
utility (the overall satisfaction they derive from their work, leisure, and post-tax 
earnings), while resulting in at least as much tax revenue to the government.  
1. Earnings Potential 
A central shortcoming of existing tax systems is that the government 
observes only taxpayers’ income. Income is the product of both effort and earnings 
potential, yet the government generally cannot measure either.92 How much of a 
taxpayer’s earnings were due to her earnings potential (which the economics 
literature generally calls “ability”), and how much were due to her efforts? The 
government generally cannot tell. If the government knew each taxpayer’s earnings 
potential, it could implement the “first-best” system wherein each taxpayer’s only 
tax burden would be a lump sum based on earnings potential.93 Such lump-sum 
taxes would be efficient, since the marginal tax rate would be zero, removing tax 
distortions on work decisions.94 This approach would be equitable too, imposing 
higher burdens on those most able to pay.95 For example, a surgeon might be 
charged a single lump-sum $100,000 tax bill, and then pay zero additional tax, 
preventing tax from distorting her work decisions. 
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 See Klein, supra note 64 (arguing for such bifurcation with business travel expenses); I.R.C. § 274(n) 
(allowing part deductibility of most business meals).  
92
 E.g., James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 
175 (1971); see also N. Gregory Mankiw et al., Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 
147, 161 (2009) (“Mirrlees . . . identified the heart of the problem of tax design to be the tax authority’s lack 
of information about individuals’ abilities.”).  
93
 Mankiw et al., supra note 92, at 149–50.  
94
 Id. at 149.  
95
 Id. at 149–50.  




Because the government cannot measure earnings potential, such a first-
best system is impossible. But the tax system can be improved by incorporating 
estimates of earnings potential.96 George Akerlof famously proposed using easily 
observable personal characteristics—which he called “tags”—that correlate with a 
taxpayer’s earnings potential, to adjust the tax burden.97 Examples of “tags” that 
could be used include educational attainment, earnings history, age, and I.Q.98 
Taxpayers possessing characteristics associated with higher earnings potential 
would have higher tax rates than those without the characteristic. The underlying 
theory is that those with higher earnings potential can earn more with less effort, 
and so total social utility is maximized by charging higher taxes on those with 
higher earnings potential.99  
N. Gregory Mankiw and Matthew Weinzierl applied tagging to height.100 
Being taller correlates with earnings potential, with every additional inch of height 
as an adult being associated with a 1.8% increase in wages.101 Because tall people 
can earn income more easily than short people, the authors suggested, total 
economic utility would be maximized by charging higher income tax rates on taller 
people than on shorter people. Such tagging would redistribute income from the tall 
to the short, thus improving equity, while improving efficiency by equalizing the 
marginal benefits of consumption across people.  
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 Economists have developed mechanisms beyond those discussed in the main text, though often complex and 
impractical ones, to allow sorting. For example, Joseph Stiglitz has proposed using the threat of randomizing 
tax rates for those who appear to the government to be low-earnings-potential, while not randomizing rates for 
those who declare themselves to be high- earnings-potential. See Stiglitz, supra note 7. Under the reasonable 
assumption that those with higher earnings potential are more risk averse, this randomization encourages high-
earnings-potential individuals to fulfill their full potential, contributing more to the economy and to tax 
revenues. Those additional tax revenues can compensate the lower-earnings-potential individuals so that they 
are better off despite the randomization.  
97
 George A. Akerlof, The Economics of “Tagging” as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, 
and Manpower Planning, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 8 (1978).  
98
 Mirrlees, supra note 92, at 175 (identifying some possible types of tagging, thus laying the groundwork for 
Akerlof’s tagging analysis); Mankiw et al., supra note 92, at 161 (noting that Mirrlees thus laid the groundwork 
for tagging).  
99
 There are various different utility functions that a social planner might aim to maximize, although the most 
common is maximizing total social utility (which is the same as average social utility). See Mankiw et al., supra 
note 92, at 148.  
100
 N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl, The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian 
Income Redistribution, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 155 (2010); see also Alberto Alesina, Andrea Ichino & 
Loukas Karabarbounis, Gender-based Taxation and the Division of Household Chores, 3 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. 
POL’Y 1 (2011) (applying tagging to gender, with men receiving higher marginal tax rates). 
101
 Nicola Persico, Andrew Postlewaite & Dan Silverman, The Effect of Adolescent Experience on Labor 
Market Outcomes: The Case of Height, 112 J. POL. ECON. 1019 (2004). This finding is based on the wages of 
white adult males, to avoid differences in race and gender. Timothy A. Judge & Daniel M. Cable, The Effect 
of Physical Height on Workplace Success and Income: Preliminary Test of a Theoretical Model, 89 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 428 (2004) find similar results when controlling for gender, weight, and age.  




Mankiw and Weinzierl leave open the possibility that the seeming absurdity 
of their proposal reveals a flaw in the dominant utilitarian optimal taxation 
framework.102 Their proposal may simply highlight that the tax system generally 
does not consider information other than income, because most such information 
would be far more difficult to collect than height. A limitation of tagging is that it 
provides taxpayers no incentives to reveal hidden information. Tagging depends on 
observable information. The tax authority would need to require taxpayers to reveal 
information that taxpayers may consider personal, and the tax authority would also 
need to enforce honest reporting.  
By contrast, allowing private intermediaries to offer alternative tax regimes 
would encourage taxpayers to reveal information in two ways. First, taxpayers 
would implicitly reveal a great deal of information by deciding whether (or not) to 
opt into an alternative tax regime that a private intermediary has offered them. 
Second, the private intermediaries can require that taxpayers provide private 
information (e.g., their college major and GPA) as a prerequisite for being allowed 
to opt into an alternative tax regime. Contractual tax reform thus provides a 
systematic framework for revealing and using such information, while still leaving 
taxpayers with the option of not sharing information at all, if they so choose. 
Another explanation for the existing tax system’s failure to embrace tagging 
is that it generally involves taking from one group (e.g., the tall) and giving to 
another group (e.g., the short). In other words, tagging is Kaldor-Hicks efficient, 
increasing total social utility, but tagging is generally not Pareto efficient, since 
some taxpayers (e.g., the tall) lose from the policy.103 Politically, tagging is difficult 
to implement, because high-earnings-potential groups like the tall and the educated 
will be motivated to organize politically to fight it.104 By contrast, contractual tax 
reform is Pareto efficient because taxpayers must opt in, and only those taxpayers 
who foresee that an alternative tax regime will leave them better off will opt-in. 
This opting-in thus can separate out high-earnings-potential taxpayers from those 
with low earnings potential.  
Consider the following example. Suppose for simplicity that the default tax 
system105 has just two tax brackets: all taxable income between zero dollars and 
$50,000 is taxed at 10%, while all taxable income above $50,000 is taxed at 40%. 
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 The utilitarian framework does not seem to leave any role for considerations of horizontal equity. See, e.g., 
Mankiw & Weinzierl, supra note 100, at 174. But Mankiw and Weinzierl ask rhetorically, “Why would society 
sacrifice potentially large gains for its average member to preserve equal treatment of individuals within an 
arbitrarily-defined group?” Id. at 175.  
103
 Mankiw and Weinzierl show that height-sensitive taxation could be Pareto efficient relative to a regime that 
does not take height into account, but that the magnitude of the Pareto improvement would be small, with 
Pareto-improving height-based taxes involving only a few dollars. Id. at 172–73.  
104
 Perhaps largely for this reason, tagging’s use has largely been restricted to negative taxation, such as welfare 
benefits. See Mankiw et al., supra note 92, at 163.  
105
 Current U.S. federal income tax has seven tax brackets. See I.R.C. § 1(a)-(d) & (i).  




Consider two individuals who both make $100,000 per year: H, who has high 
earnings potential, and L, who has low earnings potential. To earn this income 
despite having low earnings potential, L toils long hours; meanwhile, H earns this 
income working only modest hours. For L, we assume that a lower marginal rate 
would be unlikely to induce harder work, since L is already working quite hard and 
the disutility from cutting into L’s scarce remaining free time would discourage 
further effort. But for H, a lower marginal rate could quite likely induce harder 
work, since H is not currently working hard and, being high-earnings-potential, can 
earn additional money with relatively little additional effort.  
Suppose that both H and L were offered an alternative tax regime that 
involved a lump-sum payment of $20,000, plus a mere 10% marginal tax rate on 
all income. This alternative rate schedule is a simple example of higher 
inframarginal rates and lower marginal rates. How would H and L react?  
Two diagrams below explain their reactions. These diagrams build on the 
existing economic literature that models taxpayers’ preferences for after-tax 
income versus leisure.106 These models make the generally reasonable assumption 
that taxpayers derive more utility from both having more after-tax income and more 
leisure.107 For any taxpayer and any level of achievable utility, a convex function 
called an “indifference curve” represents all combinations of pre-tax income (which 
is earned by a combination of effort and earnings potential) and after-tax income 
(which is available for consumption) that achieve the same level of utility. The 
higher the indifference curve, the higher the level of utility achieved by the 
taxpayer.  
Figure 1 illustrates high-earnings-potential H’s behavior under both existing 
law and the alternative regime. The horizontal axis is pre-tax income, while the 
vertical axis is the income left after taxes, available for consumption. The dashed 
line is the existing tax-rate schedule. This line is “kinked” because the existing tax-
rate schedule in our hypothetical has two different brackets: 10% and then 40%. 
The slope of this tax schedule is 0.9 up to $50,000 in pre-tax income (because the 
government takes the remaining 0.1 or 10%), but then has the “kink,” taking the 
slope 0.6 beyond $50,000 (because the government takes the remaining 0.4 or 
40%). By contrast, the straight gray line is the alternative regime’s tax-rate 
schedule, which starts at negative $20,000, because that is the lump-sum payment 
that must be made in the alternative regime. The line then has a slope of 0.9 at every 
amount of pre-tax income (because the government always takes the remaining 
10%). The two solid black, curved lines are H’s two relevant indifference curves.  
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 Stiglitz, supra note 7, at 216–18. 
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 Id. at 216 (assuming “∂Ui/∂Ci > 0,” which means utility U goes up as consumption C (i.e., after-tax income) 
goes up, and assuming that “∂Ui/∂Li < 0,” which means utility U goes down as hours worked L (which “could 
equally well be interpreted as being effort”) goes up).  





H benefits from opting-into the alternative regime, which causes H to work 
harder and earn a pre-tax income of $120,000, with $88,000 left after taxes under 
the alternative regime. This combination of higher effort and additional after-tax 
income (increasing from $75,000 to $88,000) makes H happier, shown by the 
higher indifference curve. Meanwhile, the government has increased the tax it 
collects from H from $25,000 under existing law to $32,000 under the alternative 
tax regime. Allowing H to opt in results in a win-win for both H and the 
government.  
By contrast, Figure 2 illustrates low-earnings-potential L’s reaction to the 
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Figure 1: Model of how high-earnings-potential H  








since additional after-tax income does little to compensate for cutting into L’s 
already scarce hours of leisure.108  
 
The indifference curve that L achieves under current law is already higher 
than the alternative regime’s tax schedule, at all possible levels of pre-tax income. 
Being taxed under the alternative regime would thus lower L’s utility, so L will not 
be interested in opting-into the alternative tax regime. Intuitively, L already works 
so hard to earn $100,000 in pre-tax income that the alternative rate schedule would 
leave L worse off (hence, L will not opt in).  
By offering the same alternative rate schedule to both H and L—both of 
whom currently earn $100,000—a private intermediary can determine which has 
high earnings potential and which has low earnings potential. Moreover, the 
alternative rate schedule simultaneously makes H happier and raises more tax 
revenue from H.  
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 Id. at 217–18 (“individuals of higher ability have flatter indifference curves . . . the increase in consumption 
that is required to compensate an individual for a given increase in before tax income is smaller for the more 
able, since to obtain the given increase in before tax income he needs to forgo less leisure.”). Recall that the 
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The danger in offering such an alternative tax schedule is that opportunistic 
taxpayers might take advantage of it. Suppose that opportunistic taxpayer O earns 
$100,000 before taxes, but knows that his income is about to shoot upwards to 
$125,000 next year because of a coming promotion. Offering the alternative tax 
regime to O would result in a windfall for O at the expense of government 
revenues.109 This is where artificial intelligence plays a role. Artifical intelligence 
can help identify which taxpayers might increase their work effort for higher after-
tax pay, and which taxpayers are likely to receive salary increases regardless of tax 
regime. The private intermediary has a strong financial incentive to find data and 
analyze it using AI to distinguish O from H and L – and to not invite O to opt into 
the alternative tax regime.  
2. Work vs. Leisure Preferences 
Even taxpayers with identical earnings potential may differ in their 
preferences for leisure versus after-tax income. Contractual tax reform can 
accommodate this diversity to offer alternative tax regimes that leave both 
taxpayers and the government better off. Suppose for simplicity—as in the previous 
section—that the existing tax system has just two tax brackets: all taxable income 
between zero dollars and $50,000 is taxed at 10%, while all taxable income above 
$50,000 is taxed at 40%. Assume that under the existing tax system, taxpayers A 
and B both maximize their utility by putting in 40 hours of effort, thus earning 
$100,000 in taxable income and paying $25,000 in taxes.110 A private intermediary 
offers both an alternative tax regime with a single, flat rate of 25% on all income. 
This alternative tax regime imposes the exact same tax liability—$25,000—on the 
taxpayers if they continue to earn $100,000. But they may not.  
Assume that A opts in this alternative regime and maximizes her utility by 
working 10 more hours per week, thus earning $120,000 instead of $100,000. This 
outcome would result in $5,000 in additional tax revenues and $15,000 in additional 
after-tax money for A. It is a win-win for tax revenues and for A. This example 
demonstrates how offering alternative tax regimes can increase the work incentives 
of those taxpayers for whom lower marginal rates—and hence a higher return to 
additional work—would be worth the reduction of leisure. In effect, A has received 
lower marginal rates on additional income (decreased to 25% from 40%) in 
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 Under generally applicable tax law, O would have to pay taxes of 10% on the first $50,000 of income (i.e., 
$5,000) plus 40% on the remaining $150,000 (i.e., $60,000), for a total of $65,000. By contrast, under the 
alternative tax regime, O would have to pay the lump-sum of $20,000 plus 10% of the $200,000 income (i.e., 
$20,000), for a total of only $40,000, which is a $25,000 windfall to O.  
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 10% times the first $50,000 in income results in $5,000 in taxes. 40% times the next $50,000 in 
income results in $20,000 in taxes. Adding the $5,000 and $20,000 in taxes gives total taxes of 
$25,000.  




exchange for higher rates on her inframarginal income (increased to 25% from 10% 
on the first $50,000) dollars.  
Suppose that B declines to opt into the alternative tax regime. Why might B 
not opt in? B may simply not have the opportunity to earn more than $100,000 
under any circumstances. Maybe B has a salaried government job that does not 
allow for bonuses, meaning B would have to change jobs to earn more than 
$100,000. Maybe B is covered by a collective bargaining agreement fixing hours 
and compensation. Or, B may have time commitments outside of work (e.g. 
children, hobbies) that make working more than 40 hours unacceptable. Regardless 
of the reason, the alternative tax regime has caused A and B to reveal their divergent 
preferences for after-tax income versus leisure, with A, B, and tax revenues all left 
either just as well off or better off.  
Two simple diagrams below demonstrate how A and B can have different 
preferences for after-tax income versus leisure—and thus why A chooses the 
alternative tax regime while B does not. Figure 3 illustrates A’s behavior under both 
existing law and the alternative regime. The diagram is similar to Figures 1 and 2, 
except that the alternative tax regime’s rate schedule is different, represented below 
by the straight gray line. This line has a slope of 0.75 at every amount of pre-tax 
income (because the government always takes the remaining 0.25 or 25%).  





Under existing law, A maximizes her utility by working so that the existing 
rate schedule (i.e., the “kinked” dashed line) intersects her highest possible 
indifference curve (corresponding to highest possibility utility). A does this by 
working enough to earn $100,000 in pre-tax income, leaving her with $75,000 in 
after-tax income. But with the alternative rate schedule (the gray line), there is a 
higher indifference curve that intersects the gray line, where A earns $120,000 in 
pre-tax income, leaving her with $90,000 in after-tax income. A would opt into the 
alternative regime, choosing to work the extra 10 hours per week and getting more 
utility.  
Why would B not opt-into the alternative regime?111 Figure 4 illustrates 
why. B’s indifference curves are quite different than A’s.  
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 Most of the tax literature assumes, unrealistically, that all taxpayers have the same utility functions with 
respect to after-tax income and leisure. See BOADWAY, supra note 6, at 186. Contractual tax reform relaxes this 
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Figure 3: Model of how A responds to alternative tax schedule 
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The indifference curve including B’s current work choice has a “kink” at a 
pre-tax income of $100,000, so that earning any more than $100,000 would require 
much higher after-tax income to result in the same utility. The alternative rate 
schedule does not intersect any higher indifference curve, meaning that there is no 
way that the alternative regime can give B a higher utility than existing law. As a 
result, B will not opt into the alternative regime, thus revealing—and 
accommodating—B’s different preferences from A. 
Opportunistic taxpayers might try to take advantage of the option of the 
alternative regime to minimize taxes. For example, suppose that taxpayer C 
currently earns $100,000, just like A and B, subject to $25,000 in tax under the 
existing rate schedules. But suppose that C knew that her employer was already 
planning to raise her compensation from $100,000 to $120,000 next year, without 
C needing to work any harder. When viewed in terms of the model presented in 
Figures 3 and 4, C’s impending pay raise results in a shift of C’s “indifference 
curves” to the right, as the same amount of effort results in greater pre-tax income. 




















B’s work choice  









and save $3,000 in taxes with no additional effort.112 If offered to C, the alternative 
tax regime is not Pareto-efficient, giving C a windfall at the expense of government 
tax revenues.  
Private intermediaries would have an incentive to use all available data and 
AI to identify taxpayers like C and not to offer them the opportunity to opt into this 
alternative tax regime. For example, taxpayers such as A and B may be in 
professions with stable incomes, whereas C’s profession may offer frequent upticks 
in compensation. As another example, C may have just completed a new 
professional certification that would naturally foreshadow a pay increase. Or, C 
may have engaged in behavior consistent with someone expecting an increase in 
earnings, such as taking title to a new luxury car. 
Using computer models to predict incomes has already been a reality for 
nearly a decade. Experian PLC, one of the credit-reporting agencies, introduced a 
service in 2011 called Income Insight that predicts an individual’s income, based 
solely on credit-report data, without even seeing the individual’s tax returns.113 
Artificial intelligence drawing from even more data, including complete tax 
histories, credit reports, vehicle registrations, and various other government 
records, could predict next year’s income still more accurately. AI could predict 
not only future income, but also the probability of a substantial jump in income, 
like the one C expected in the example above. Private intermediaries would have a 
strong incentive to obtain relevant data from taxpayers and train their AI models 
properly to identify such taxpayers—and not offer them the alternative regime.  
This example demonstrates an important point: the AI used by private 
intermediaries need not be perfect for contractual tax reform to make society better-
off. When taxpayers like A opt into an alternative regime, then the economic “pie” 
gets bigger: A ends up with higher utility, and the government ends up with more 
tax revenue than otherwise ($5,000 in the example above). If a taxpayer like C is 
accidentally allowed to opt into the alternative regime, the economic pie does not 
get smaller. Rather, a slice of the pie ($3,000 in the example above) is transferred 
to C, who pays less in taxes.114 The increased tax collections from A more than 
offset the lost tax from C, while both A and C are left better off.  
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 Recall that we assumed that current law imposed a 10% rate on the first $50,000 of income and then 40% 
on all income above $50,000; under that schedule, $120,000 in income would result in $33,000 in taxes. But 
under the alternative regime all income would be taxed at 25%; $125,000 in income would result in just $30,000 
in taxes. 
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 Scott Thurm, Data Mining Your Mind — The Next Frontier Is Predicting Personal Behavior; The ‘Ability 
to Pay’ Index, WALL ST. J., Oct. 27, 2011, at B1.  
114
 Indeed, suppose that the alternative tax regime in the example were offered to A, B, and C. Of these, B 
would not opt in because of the “kinked” indifference curves discussed above. But A and C would both opt in, 
with the government gaining $5,000 in additional taxes from A and losing $3,000 by giving a tax windfall to 
C. The government comes out overall with $2,000 in additional tax revenues.  




Private intermediaries might use a number of other creative strategies to 
prevent opportunistic taxpayer behavior like C’s above. For example, some jobs 
produce reliable metrics of effort, such as factory workers’ hours clocked or law-
firm lawyers’ hours billed.115 For taxpayers with such jobs, the alternative tax 
regime might provide the lower marginal rates only if the taxpayer demonstrates an 
increase in hours worked. This example highlights a broader point: the current one-
size-fits-all approach to tax law is constrained by the feasibility of obtaining 
information, whereas contractual tax reform allows alternative tax regimes to be 
available only to taxpayers for whom relevant information is available. For such 
taxpayers, an alternative tax regime can create a win-win for both the taxpayers and 
the government.  
C. Reducing Waste 
1. Saving on Compliance Costs 
The current tax system has staggeringly large compliance costs: not only 
amounts paid directly to tax preparers and tax software providers, but also 
taxpayers’ time. Although estimates vary based on methodologies, complying with 
the tax code likely costs the U.S. economy between $150 billion and $250 billion 
per year.116 Although contractual tax reform will itself entail some transaction costs 
– as do all contracts – alternative tax regimes could simplify the tax code and reduce 
total compliance costs. Scholars and policymakers have proposed many ways to 
make tax compliance less costly.117 But uncertainty, inertia, gridlock, and special 
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 Optimal tax literature generally assumes that the government cannot directly observe taxpayers’ effort. See, 
e.g., Mankiw et al., supra note 92, at 150 (“The planner can observe income, which depends on both ability 
and effort, but the planner can observe neither ability nor effort directly.”). Recall that the economics literature 
uses the term “ability” where we have been using the term “earnings potential.” Although true for many 
professions, this assumption may not be quite accurate for those taxpayers whose hours are clocked.  
116
 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-878, SUMMARY OF ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS OF THE 
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM (Aug. 26, 2005), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-878 (estimating 2005 
compliance costs of $107 billion, likely lower than current costs due to inflation and increased tax-code 
complexity); DEMIAN BRADY, NATIONAL TAXPAYERS UNION FOUNDATION, TAX COMPLEXITY 2016 (Apr. 6, 
2016), http://www.ntu.org/foundation/detail/tax-complexity-2016-the-increasing-compliance-burdens-of-the-
tax-code (estimating current compliance costs at $234.4 billion); JASON J. FICHTNER & JACOB M. FELDMAN, 
THE HIDDEN COSTS OF TAX COMPLIANCE (2013), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Fichtner_TaxCompliance_v3.pdf (using broader definition of costs and 
reaching U.S. estimates ranging between $215 billion and $987 billion). 
117
 See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Some Income Tax Simplification Proposals, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 71 (2013) 
(providing several dozen proposals); William G. Gale, Fixing the Tax System: Support Fairer Simpler, and 
More Adequate Taxation (Brookings Institution Opportunity 08 Paper, Feb. 28, 2007), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PB_TaxPolicy_Gale.pdf.  




interests have prevented implementation.118 Contractual tax reform could bypass 
this inertia and unlock savings from tax simplification by allowing taxpayers to opt 
into alternative tax regimes—many likely based on preexisting work by tax 
scholars—that simplify compliance.  
For example, a bewildering array of tax provisions govern retirement 
savings, creating compliance burdens for taxpayers, their employers, and financial 
institutions handling retirement accounts.119 These provisions could be greatly 
simplified.120 Similarly, taxpayers currently must calculate their tax liability twice, 
once using the normal rules, and again using the different rules of the alternative 
minimum tax.121 An alternative tax regime could provide a single robust set of rules 
and a single set of rates, requiring calculating liability only once.  
2. Closing the “Tax Gap”  
The IRS currently collects only approximately 84% of taxes due.122 The 
uncollected 16%, about $400 billion per year,123 is the “tax gap.”124 The largest 
component of the tax gap is underreporting of gross income by individuals or self-
employed business owners.125 Taxpayers who receive wages or salaries have an 
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 See James C. Gould, Tax Reform, Congress, and Politics, 146 TAX NOTES 983 (Feb. 23, 2015) (“[T]he 
highly visible base-broadening side of a major tax reform bill has the capacity to anger interest groups 
representing nearly every part of the population and every region of the country . . . .”); Joseph Bankman, Using 
Technology to Simplify Individual Tax Filing, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 773 (2008) (noting that Intuit and other return-
preparers have fought tax simplification moves); Farhad Manjoo, Would You Let the I.R.S. Prepare Your 
Taxes?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2015, at B11 (same).  
119
 Dodge, supra note 117, at 123–34.  
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 Id. There is bipartisan support for simplifying the mishmash of tax rules governing retirement. See Zachary 
Abate, Legislative Outlook: Hearings on Tax Returns, Retirement Security Planned, 2019 TAX NOTES TODAY 
23-9 (Feb. 4, 2019) (noting that the new Democratic chair of the House Ways and Means Committee plans to 
reintroduce the Retirement Plan Simplification and Enhancement Act of 2017 in the new Congress).  
121
 I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (imposing alternative minimum tax (AMT) and mandating differences in calculation). See 
generally LISA MARIE STARCZEWSKI, PORTFOLIO 587: NONCORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX (3d ed. 
2019) (giving overview of AMT as applied to individuals and other noncorporate taxpayers).  
122
 IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008-2010, at 1 (Apr. 2016), reprinted in 2016 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 83-30. These are the latest years for which data are available given the length of time required to audit 
taxpayers and resolve disputes. See also William Hoffman, Tax Gap Widens, Compliance Rate Falls; Wyden 
Calls for Crackdown, 151 TAX NOTES 586 (May 2, 2016) (discussing this IRS tax-gap estimates release).  
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 IRS, supra note 122, at 1 (estimating the net tax gap, which is the gap never ultimately collected even after 
IRS enforcement actions, as $406 billion).  
124
 Id. (discussing definition).  
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 There are three basic components of the tax gap: (1) taxpayers who do not file tax returns as required; (2) 
underreporting of tax liability on filed returns; and (3) taxpayers who underpay the liabilities shown on their 
returns. IRS, supra note 122, att. 1. Category (2) is far and away the largest, and it has two large subcomponents 
that correspond directly to underreporting by individuals who own businesses and/or are self-employed: 
$125 billion in individuals underreporting the income tax due on their business income, and $65 billion by self-




extraordinarily high level of compliance,126 because their employers are required to 
send a W-2 listing their gross income to the IRS,127 which cross-checks the W-2 
against the tax return by matching the Social Security Number. By contrast, 
business owners and the self-employed are generally not subject to information 
reporting like the W-2, and their underreporting is the largest component of the tax 
gap.128 Increased information reporting requirements on business owners and the 
self-employed are widely recognized as central to reducing the tax gap.129  
Contractual tax reform could help close the tax gap in two ways. First, 
private intermediaries would have an incentive to offer low-compliance-group 
taxpayers alternative tax regimes that arrange for stringent information reporting, 
in exchange for lower tax rates. For example, an alternative tax regime offered to a 
shopkeeper could involve both the cash register and the credit-card reader reporting 
all transactions to the private intermediary via the internet—potentially reinforced 
by having a videocamera recording all activity in the store to ensure that no cash is 
paid “under the counter.” In exchange, the shopkeeper could receive lower rates or 
some other benefit such as a simplified tax system. Research shows that many 
taxpayers who underreport their taxes would like to be in full compliance but do 
not comply because they feel that their competitors do not comply.130 Such 
taxpayers might happily opt into an alternative tax regime with higher monitoring, 
but lower tax rates.  
Second, contractual tax reform could allow the IRS to focus its limited 
enforcement resources on taxpayers least likely to be compliant: those to whom 
private intermediaries offered alternative regimes involving more monitoring, but 
                                                 
employed individuals underreporting the Social Security and Medicare taxes due on their income. Id. 
126
 Id. at 2 (“income . . . subject to substantial information reporting and withholding” which includes wages 
and salaries results in only 1% of the total underreporting for Individual Income Taxes).  
127
 I.R.C. § 6041; id. § 6051; Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-2(a). The requirement to file W-2s is backed up by fines 
and up to one year in jail time. I.R.C. § 6674; id. § 7204. 
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 IRS, supra note 122, att. 3 (“Income subject to little or no information reporting,” which “includes nonfarm 
proprietor income, other income, rents and royalties, farm income, Form 4797 income,” results in 63% of total 
underreporting for Individual Income Taxes); accord GENE L. DODARO, GAO-16-92T, COMPTROLLER 
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, BEFORE THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE (Oct. 1, 2015) (“Where there is 
little or no information reporting, such as with business income, taxpayers tend to significantly misreport their 
income.”).  
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ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 REVENUE PROPOSALS 198–201 (Feb. 2016) (proposing two information-
reporting requirement reforms to reduce the tax gap).  
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 Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1453, 1504–06 (2003); Susan Cleary Morse, Joseph Bankman & Stewart Karlinsky, Cash Businesses and Tax 
Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37 (2009); cf. Christopher Bergin, CID to Employment Tax Evaders: ‘We 
Will Catch You’, 91 TAX NOTES 1220 (2001) (“[S]ome employers turn to evading taxes to stay competitive in 
their industry.”). 




who declined to opt in.131 Merely offering the alternative regime causes taxpayers 
to reveal information about themselves, and this information could be used to better 
focus audit resources.132 This benefit stands in stark contrast to most of the benefits 
we have already discussed, which are Pareto-efficient, leaving the government, 
each taxpayer, and the private intermediary no worse off than before (and often 
better off). Allowing the IRS to focus enforcement resources on taxpayers who 
decline to opt into alternative regimes involving more substantiation will be worse 
off. But this detriment to low-compliance taxpayers will likely benefit society as a 
whole by increasing compliance rates. 
D. Opening the Overton Window 
As these examples suggest, private intermediaries might embrace ideas that 
are well beyond the range of political plausibility, that are outside the “Overton 
window” of acceptable political discourse.133 Private intermediaries could offer 
alternative tax regimes that are radically different from the current system. The 
progressive economist Dean Baker has argued that instead of taxing corporations 
based on their pre-tax profits,134 the government should become minority 
shareholders in corporate enterprises.135 Under this proposal, the government would 
receive nonvoting shares in an amount designed to provide the same revenues as 
the corporate tax, and the corporation would then be entirely free from paying 
corporate taxes. The corporation would no longer have an incentive to hire legions 
of well-paid tax advisors to take economically distortionary steps to minimize 
taxes.136  
This proposal is not a radical departure economically, as the government is 
effectively already a passive minority shareholder in every entity that pays taxes.137 
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 Economists have developed many sorting mechanisms to discover this taxpayer information, with the goal 
of optimizing tax law enforcement. E.g., Parkash Chander & Louis L. Wilde, A General Characterization of 
Optimal Income Tax Enforcement, 65 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1998). Yet none of these mechanisms has the 
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 Cf. Raskolnikov, supra note 6 (proposing requiring taxpayers to choose between higher penalties or a more 
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 See generally Joseph Lehman, A Brief Explanation of the Overton Window, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUBLIC 
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 See Mihir A. Desai et al., Theft and Taxes, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 591, 592 (2007) (“The state, thanks to its tax 




But it would be a radical departure institutionally and legally. If this reform were 
implemented in generally applicable law, it would run into legal obstacles like the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause.138 Moreover, implementing this reform for all 
corporations at once would be risky, because it might not produce as much tax 
revenue in the short-term as the current corporate tax system.139 This reform, 
however, could be offered as an alternative tax regime. If it indeed offers substantial 
efficiency gains, then it would offer substantial benefits to taxpayers (here, 
corporations), the government (through higher revenue), and private intermediaries 
that offer it.140 At the same time, it might change the public conception of what is 
possible in the tax system, either opening the Overton window when private 
regimes prove attractive or closing it decisively should they fail. 
Other reform proposals outside the current Overton window could be 
offered as alternative tax regimes. For example, corporations might be offered 
lower corporate rates, in exchange for losing the deduction for interest paid on 
debt.141 As another example, publicly traded securities held by individuals for 
investment could be marked-to-market, meaning that taxpayers would recognize 
gains and losses each year even if they do not sell the securities.142 In exchange for 
marking-to-market, taxpayers might get a lower rate for gains when their securities 
increase in value. Contractual tax reform allows experimentation with a nearly 
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endless variety of possible alternative tax regimes, and it provides private 
intermediaries with incentives to develop alternatives not previously considered. 
II. IMPLEMENTATION 
The previous Part suggested some possible alternative tax regimes that 
private intermediaries might offer. These were hypothetical examples; the private 
intermediaries themselves would take the initiative in designing alternative tax 
regimes and deciding which taxpayers to invite to opt in. Contractual tax reform is 
voluntary; private intermediaries decide what alternative regime to offer and to 
whom, and invited taxpayers decide whether to opt in. It thus does not amount to 
privatization in any conventional sense. Privatization may enable government 
agencies to circumvent the legislative process to accomplish idiosyncratic policy 
goals,143 but contractual tax reform does not give government officials discretion. 
And while critics argue that privatization is based on a myth “that markets are more 
efficient than government,”144 our proposal is agnostic about in what areas and for 
which taxpayers, private intermediaries may be able to improve existing law. If 
private intermediaries cannot provide an alternative tax regime that leaves both 
taxpayers and the government’s coffers better off, tax law and institutions will 
simply continue to function as before. 
A. Basic Mechanics: Treatment Group and Control Group 
A private intermediary—say, “Taxes, Inc.”—would both design the 
alternative tax regime and solicit taxpayers to opt in to the alternative regime. Some 
invited taxpayers would simply decline to opt in. Others might be refused entry by 
the intermediary based on further data analysis.145 Of the taxpayers who remain, 
most (say, 90%) would in fact be subject to the alternative tax regime.146 These 
taxpayers are the “treatment group,” with their tax treatment specified in the 
alternative tax regime.  
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Some percentage (say, 10%) of taxpayers who are invited and who opt in 
would randomly be assigned to serve as the “control group,” subject to generally 
applicable tax law, filing their returns with the IRS. Taxes, Inc., would be required 
to ensure that the government received tax revenues from the treatment group based 
on the taxes collected from those in the control group. Given the percentages in our 
example, Taxes, Inc., could be required to pay the government 9.0 times the taxes 
paid by the control group,147 ensuring revenue neutrality for the government. 
Alternatively, Taxes, Inc. could be required to pay the government 9.0 times the 
taxes paid by the control group, plus some percentage, set by formula, of any excess 
collected from the treatment group. This arrangement would make contractual tax 
reform a potential revenue-raiser for the government, helping to reduce deficits or 
to fund new social spending.  
B. The Role of Intermediaries 
The role of the private tax intermediary is similar to an insurance company 
in two fundamental ways: designing a legal instrument and deciding to whom to 
offer it. Insurers design insurance policies for a risk pool and then decide who is 
eligible to buy into that risk pool. Similarly, private tax intermediaries would design 
alternative tax regimes and decide who is eligible to opt into the alternative tax 
regime. Insurers aim to collect more in premiums than they pay out on policies. 
Private tax intermediaries would aim to collect more in taxes from the treatment 
group than the control group’s taxes suggests the treatment group would have paid. 
Both insurers and private tax intermediaries must worry about adverse selection.148 
In this context, adverse selection represents the possibility that those opting in are 
in fact those who would pay lower taxes to the private provider than to the 
government. Private intermediaries would use data and AI, plus careful design of 
the alternative tax regime, to combat such adverse selection. 
This Section explores the private intermediaries in more detail. Part II.B.1 
addresses which tasks the intermediary would take and which tasks would remain 
the responsibility of the tax authority. Part II.B.2 explores the organizational form 
of tax intermediaries, noting that they might be for-profit or nonprofit cooperatives, 
and Part II.B.3 examines the duration of the intermediary and of its contract with 
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the insured. Finally, Part II.B.4 explains different strategies that the government 
might use to ensure that the intermediaries will in fact be able to pay their tax bills, 
as calculated from the tax bills of the control group. 
1. Division of Responsibility 
Contractual tax reform can work with either the existing tax authority (i.e., 
the IRS) or the private intermediary handling administration.149 With IRS 
administration, the private intermediary might design the alternative tax regime, but 
all taxpayers in the treatment group would still file an annual tax return with the 
IRS. The return would include a tax form identifying the intermediary and the 
alternative tax regime. The IRS would continue to handle return processing, 
auditing, and collection activities.150 Alternatively, the private intermediary might 
handle administration, replacing the treatment-group taxpayers’ need to file tax 
returns with the IRS. The taxpayers might file a return designed by the private 
intermediary, with the private intermediary – or potentially even no return at all.151 
In other words, alternative tax regimes could offer different procedural law.  
With private administration, substantive tax law might even be unchanged. 
This highlights that contractual tax reform can be used to improve tax procedure as 
well as tax substance. IRS tax administration currently suffers from two interrelated 
failures. First, the IRS is large,152 cumbersome, and slow, failing to take full 
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advantage of new technology.153 Second, Congress has underfunded the IRS,154 with 
each additional $1 spent on enforcement and administration resulting in at least $5 
in additional revenue collected.155 Private tax intermediaries would be able to raise 
private capital to improve collections and to improve technology systems, outside 
the constraints of congressional budgeting that hamper the IRS.156 Given a more 
efficient collection process that induces greater compliance, intermediaries might 
be able to offer participating taxpayers a small discount on their total liability. 
Even if an alternative tax regime used the private intermediary as 
administrator in lieu of the IRS, it would not free taxpayers from possible criminal 
liability. Fraud against private intermediaries would still be criminal tax fraud.157 
Like insurers constantly seeking to ferret out insurance fraud,158 private tax 
intermediaries would have incentives to investigate such conduct and refer it to 
prosecutors.  
2. Organizational Form 
Some of the largest insurance companies in the U.S. are mutual insurance 
companies, acting as cooperatives, owned by their customers, and returning profits 
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to them.159 Other insurers are for-profit, with profits going to shareholders. One 
might expect to see both models appear for private tax intermediaries.  
For-profit tax intermediaries would attempt to attract taxpayers to opt into 
their alternative tax regimes by designing them to be utility-enhancing for the 
taxpayers who opt-in. To the extent that treatment-group taxpayers pay higher taxes 
than control-group taxpayers, the intermediary will earn gross profit. Subtracting 
out the costs of designing and administering the regime, plus any percentage that 
the government might demand to make the program a revenue-raiser, would result 
in profits for shareholders.  
Cooperative tax intermediaries would, by contrast, be akin to mutual 
insurers. Mutual insurers offer insurance products generally comparable to those 
offered by for-profit insurers, sweetened by the possibility of a profit rebate. 
Cooperative tax intermediaries would offer alternative tax regimes, sweetened with 
the possibility of a tax rebate to treatment-group taxpayers.160 For example, if a 
cooperative tax intermediary offered an alternative tax regime where the treatment-
group taxpayers generated 105% of the taxpayers in the control group. Cooperative 
intermediary would refund treatment-group taxpayers 5% of their taxes paid.161 
Currently no private tax intermediaries exist—either for-profit or 
cooperative. Where would these entities come from? Some for-profit intermediaries 
would likely be similar to the current crop of “Fintech” (financial technology) firms 
that are reshaping finance – including insurance – by taking advantage of artificial 
intelligence, the lower transaction costs allowed by technology, and alternative 
funding methods.162 Companies like H&R Block, Intuit (the maker of TurboTax), 
and Jackson Hewitt Tax Service, Inc., which already have a strong presence in tax 
preparation, might also consider becoming private tax intermediaries. Indeed, these 
existing players have long strived to offer tax-related financial services to their 
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customers,163 so they might jump at the opportunity to become private tax 
intermediaries.  
Industry groups might set up cooperative tax intermediaries to offer 
alternative tax regimes that address inefficiencies in the tax code. For example, 
plumbers might find a particular substantiation requirement of the tax code too 
costly in comparison to the additional tax revenues it raises for the government. 
The Plumbing Contractors of America might offer its members an alternative tax 
regime that removes this substantiation requirement, perhaps along with a handful 
of other changes, in exchange for a slightly higher tax rate. Politically active groups 
or non-profits might set up cooperative tax intermediaries to promote behavior seen 
as virtuous. For example, environmentalist groups might offer an alternative tax 
regime that taxed carbon, in exchange for lower income-tax rates.164 We would not, 
however, allow employers to serve as intermediaries for their own employees, 
because of the danger of conflicts of interest.165 
3. Duration 
The tax year might serve as a natural duration for an agreement between a 
taxpayer and a private intermediary. Limiting duration is especially important with 
initial experiments with contractual reform, just as contractual tax reform should 
be limited in scope initially to ensure that it is capable of producing benefits.166 In 
principle, however, there could be benefits to longer duration. First, intermediaries 
might wish to enable trade-offs over time, for example by giving greater tax 
discounts for education or job training activities that the intermediaries judge to be 
likely to be successful in generating income, in exchange for higher tax rates once 
the training is complete. In this sense, contractual tax reform can serve as a modest 
version of “income share agreements,” an alternative to student loans in which 
students promise to repay a portion of their future income.167  
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Second, long durations may be useful as a way of countering a potential 
strategy in which taxpayers shift income into the contract period and out of other 
periods.168 Regardless of the duration of the contract, the government must ensure 
that the intermediaries’ profit or liability depends on all future tax payments by 
treatment and control group taxpayers. Suppose, for example, that an intermediary 
offers an unusually attractive capital gains rate, leading taxpayers to recognize 
capital gains during that period.169 That might lead to higher tax payments in that 
year but lower tax payments later. Thus, when the treatment group taxpayers pay 
less in tax years following the initial contract, the intermediary would be 
responsible for the difference. On the flip side, the intermediaries would be paid if 
their contract led to greater income recognized later. These dangers will cause 
intermediaries to be careful in designing their tax regimes in a way that prevents 
taxpayers from exploiting timing rules to their disadvantage; for example, they 
might agree to limit capital gains recognition (perhaps to zero) during the contract. 
Still, longer-term arrangements might reduce this danger and thus be more 
attractive to both taxpayers and private intermediaries.  
4. Solvency Assurance 
The potential for long-term liabilities for private intermediaries strengthens 
the need to ensure that they will be sufficiently solvent to meet them. Suppose 
Taxes, Inc. offered a disastrous alternative tax regime that resulted in treatment-
group taxpayers generating tax revenues at a rate of only 80% of control-group 
taxpayers. Taxes, Inc. would be required to reimburse some or all of the remaining 
20% to the government. But Taxes, Inc. might have insufficient assets to reimburse 
the government, resulting in insolvency. Avoiding this situation is crucial for 
contractual tax reform to be viable, since, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
observed, “taxes are the life-blood of government, and their prompt and certain 
availability an imperious need.”170 If treatment-group taxpayers produce more 
revenue than control-group taxpayers, the intermediary’s shareholders or 
cooperative members keep some or all of the extra. But if treatment-group 
taxpayers produce less revenue, the intermediary might simply become insolvent, 
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leaving the government with less tax revenue than generally applicable tax law. The 
result might be “heads the intermediary wins, tails the government loses.”171 
Insurance and banking both provide similar risks of insolvency. Insurance 
regulation and banking regulation both provide several possible solutions that could 
work for regulating private tax intermediaries. These solutions include capital 
requirements, bonding, and caveat emptor.  
Capital requirements ensure the solvency of FDIC-insured banks172 and of 
insurers.173 Banks are required to have sufficient capital—consisting of equity and 
debt that subordinated to bank depositors—to ensure sufficient assets are available 
to repay depositors in full.174 This “capital cushion” generally needs to be larger 
when the bank is taking greater risks, and smaller when the bank is taking smaller 
risks.175 Similarly, private tax intermediaries could be required to have sufficient 
capital—consisting of equity and debt subordinated to tax revenue owed to the 
government—to ensure sufficient assets to pay the government. The greater the 
riskiness of the alternative tax regime, the more capital the intermediary would have 
to hold on its balance sheet.  
Bonding is the second model for addressing the risk of intermediary 
insolvency. When governments enter into contracts with private companies to build 
public buildings or public works, statutes require that the private companies furnish 
bonds to ensure that the building is built and that all suppliers, workers, and 
subcontractors are paid.176 A third party acts as a surety on such bonds,177 ensuring 
performance and full payment if the contractor becomes insolvent.178 Because the 
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surety will be on the hook if the contractor defaults, the surety has a strong incentive 
to scrutinize the risk that the contractor will fail to complete the project, and thus 
to charge an appropriate premium. Similarly, insurance regulators often allow 
insurance companies to post a bond to guard against the insurer becoming insolvent 
and unable to satisfy policyholders’ claims.179 Private tax intermediaries could be 
required to furnish bonds to ensure that the government is paid.  
Caveat emptor is the third model for addressing the risk of intermediary 
insolvency. Banking regulation uses this approach for wealthy depositors; FDIC 
insurance covers only the first $250,000 in deposits.180 Any deposits above 
$250,000 can be fully or partially lost if the bank becomes insolvent. Insurance 
regulation sometimes also uses this approach, as policyholders may receive less 
than the full amount owed them by an insurer that becomes insolvent.181 Applying 
this caveat emptor model to private tax intermediaries, if an intermediary becomes 
insolvent, then all taxpayers in in the treatment group would be required to pay their 
ordinary tax obligation to the government under the generally applicable tax laws. 
This approach creates incentives for taxpayers to evaluate and monitor the financial 
condition of their tax intermediary. Meanwhile, a tax intermediary could reduce the 
risk of insolvency by providing in the alternative tax regime’s definition that if tax 
receipts fall short, all treatment group taxpayers must pay an additional amount 
sufficient to cover the amount the intermediary owes to the government. Regardless 
of how implemented, caveat emptor would give participating taxpayers incentives 
to assess the feasibility of an alternative tax regime before opting into it.  
C. Regulation of Contractual Tax Reform 
Once assured that the private intermediary is solvent, the government need 
not micromanage the contract between intermediary and insured. Nonetheless, 
some regulation of contracts may be warranted, especially with early experiments 
into contractual tax reform. Part II.C.1 describes limitations that may be 
appropriate. Part II.C.2 addresses how regulations should address changes in filing 
status, such as marriage. Finally, Part II.C.3 explores how the government might 
encourage innovation among private intermediaries. 
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In principle, an alternative tax regime offered by a private tax intermediary 
might involve any changes whatsoever to tax law – procedural, substantive, or a 
combination of both. But the government would likely prohibit some changes. For 
example, to the extent that an alternative tax regime changed procedural law, the 
government would require adhering to standards of due process, like those already 
present in the tax code.182  As another example, some existing substantive tax 
benefits, like the tax credit for research and development, aim to encourage positive 
externalities or discourage negative externalities.183 The government might simply 
bar alternative tax regimes that remove such tax benefits, so that contractual tax 
reform does not reduce social welfare.   
The government would likely require intermediaries to file the alternative 
tax regime and the eligibility criteria with the government before offering it to 
taxpayers. A key design question is whether the government must approve this 
alternative regime and eligibility criteria before invitations can go out, or whether 
filing alone suffices to allow invitations. There is precedent for both approaches. In 
securities law, filing is normally all that is required for many actions.184 But in 
insurance law, regulators must approve insurers’ proposed policies,185 and at least 
in initial implementation, that approach is likely preferable. 
2. Filing Status 
Calculating the amount that a private intermediary owes becomes more 
challenging when taxpayers may change their filing status.186 In particular, an 
individual taxpayer might change his or her tax filing status by marrying or 
divorcing, and a business association might merge with another business 
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association187 or spin-off a subsidiary.188 Taxpayers might do so opportunistically, 
or for reasons having nothing to do with the experiment.  
These problems are easily addressed. Any individual or entity outside the 
treatment group for the relevant time period (whether in the control group or outside 
the experiment altogether) will continue to be subject to independent tax liability if 
it combines through marriage or merger with a taxpayer in the treatment group. For 
example, if a treatment group individual taxpayer has agreed to pay a lump sum of 
$100,000 in taxes,189 someone who marries that person cannot suddenly claim that 
the couple must pay a total of just $100,000. Similarly, if a treatment group 
company merged with a non-treatment group company, the latter would have to file 
separate corporate tax returns.190 Existing tax law already requires separate 
corporate tax returns to avoid abuse,191 so this requirement would be easily 
implemented. 
Changes in control group taxpayers’ status will matter only insofar as they 
modestly complicate the government’s calculation of the private intermediary’s 
liability. Such taxpayers have no incentive to game the system, since they pay tax 
according to the usual rules. So long as the government can develop a reasonable 
model allocating tax payment among these taxpayers, this should not be an issue. 
For example, such a model would allocate income paid by a newly married couple 
between the members of the couple, so if one had been a control group member and 
the other were not, the total control group tax payments can be approximated.192 A 
divorcing couple poses less of a challenge; just add together their subsequent tax 
payments.  
Treatment group taxpayers, in contrast, do have an incentive to game the 
system, but this is not the government’s problem. The private intermediary would 
need to address this in the alternative tax regime. Such solutions could be 
straightforward. For example, for a married couple, the alternative tax regime might 
simply treat each spouse as a separate taxpayer. This illustrates how contractual tax 
reform can accomplish a tax reform goal (eliminating the U.S.’s unusual joint-
married filing status193) without specific legislation on point.  
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This example also illustrates another advantage of contractual tax reform 
over government-run experimentation.194 If the government ran experimentation, it 
would need to worry about exploitation of loopholes by treatment group taxpayers. 
The possibility for loopholes certainly does vanish with contractual tax reform, but 
intermediaries may be able to respond much more quickly than the government to 
problems. If treatment group taxpayers exploit the alternative regime in some 
unanticipated way, then the private intermediary can update its alternative tax 
regime in the future. That process would be easier and quicker than changing 
statutes or regulations. And, unlike Congress and the IRS, private tax intermediaries 
would have strong financial incentives to seek out and close loopholes.  
 
3. Innovation Incentives 
A potential private tax intermediary faces two risks: that too few taxpayer-
customers will opt in; and that taxpayers who opt in and receive the alternative tax 
regime will pay less per capita than the control group (thus requiring reimbursing 
the government for some or all of the shortfall). The government should encourage 
potential private intermediaries to brave such risks, to foster innovation and 
experimentation in tax law.  
A private intermediary might capture the benefits from its innovations in 
several ways. The first intermediary to offer an alternative regime attractive to 
many customers would have a first-mover advantage. An intermediary might earn 
a good reputation for making taxpayer-customers happy, such as by increasing their 
utility, or with good customer service. Moreover, an intermediary’s eligibility 
criteria for each alternative tax regime should remain confidential,195 and thus 
would be trade secrets, protected from misappropriation.196 
But intermediaries may be discouraged from developing innovative 
alternative tax regimes and eligibility criteria by the threat of copy-cat 
intermediaries adopting the same regimes. Even though eligibility criteria for an 
alternative tax regime might be confidential and protected as trade secrets, 
competitors would likely at least observe which alternative tax regimes proved 
successful, based on the first-mover’s continuing to offer them. From an ex post 
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perspective, copying alternative tax regimes is desirable, because more competition 
will drive down profit and increase the benefits from alternative tax regimes to 
taxpayers (and potentially also to the government in the form of greater tax 
collections). But from an ex ante perspective, intermediaries may not be willing to 
undertake a risky new alternative tax regime without the opportunity to capture a 
significant portion of the social gains if successful.  
The intellectual property literature already provides guidance on mitigating 
the risk that copying business methods will lead to too little innovation.197 The 
government might address this problem by providing a time-limited exclusive right 
to an intermediary that is willing to commercialize an alternative tax regime 
strategy that no one else is willing to commercialize, absent the exclusive right.198 
Such a mechanism, however, would be unnecessary if intermediaries produced 
extensive innovation without it.  
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS 
We have already considered objections to contractual tax reform internal to 
the mechanism, such as whether the system might be gamed by short-term 
contracts,199 insolvent intermediaries, 200 or filing status changes. 201 We now turn to 
broader objections: that contractual tax reform might exploit participating 
taxpayers or that it might have systemic negative effects on equity. 
A. Taxpayer Exploitation 
Historical evidence shows that reward structures for tax collectors can 
create corruption and abuses.202 “Tax farming” helped precipitate the French 
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Revolution203 and Roman tax collection practices204 made tax collectors the 
quintessential sinners in the Christian gospels.205 In the Roman Empire and pre-
Revolution France, the government sold the right to collect taxes to tax collectors, 
who then had a profit incentive to squeeze as much money as possible from those 
under their jurisdiction.206 Such arrangements do bear passing resemblance to 
contractual tax reform, but only in that an intermediary stands between the taxpayer 
and government. 
Contractual tax reform differs from tax farming in crucial ways. First, tax 
farming aimed to maximize revenues for the government and for tax farmers, but 
contractual tax reform seeks primarily to increase taxpayer utility. Second, 
participation is optional. By contrast, pre-Revolutionary French taxpayers could not 
opt out of tax farming, although they sometimes tried to opt out by killing tax 
farmers.207 Third, contractual tax reform would be governed by written alternative 
tax regimes, regulated by the government to protect taxpayers, and subject to 
judicial process. Tax farming did work relatively well in democratic ancient 
Athens, where courts fairly adjudicated any disputes involving abuses by tax 
farmers.208  
The unpopularity of the IRS suggests that private tax collection could be an 
improvement,209 but regulation must ensure that contractual tax reform does not 
exploit taxpayers. We consider three different concerns: first, that private 
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intermediaries might, like tax farmers of old, take advantage of unsophisticated 
taxpayers; second, that contractual tax reform might adversely affect taxpayer 
privacy; and third, that taxpayers might be coerced into making concessions to 
private taxpayers, perhaps even unconstitutionally.  
1. Deceptive Practices 
Taxpayers may have relatively little information about private tax 
intermediaries, and the alternative tax regimes might be complicated. (However, 
the alternative tax regimes would often be far simpler than the existing voluminous 
tax code.) Some intermediaries may seek to exploit any lack of information or 
behavioral biases exhibited by taxpayers. For example, intermediaries may exploit 
hyperbolic discounting210 by inducing taxpayers to enter into alternative tax regimes 
that provide them lower taxes in one year but much higher taxes in later years.211 
This has the effect of a usurious loan, but it could be more pernicious if the 
complexity of an alternative tax regime made it hard to recognize it as such. There 
is a substantial debate in the literature about the extent to which the government 
needs to protect consumers from themselves.212  
Assuming taxpayers do need protection, a familiar approach is for the 
government to police disclosure rigorously. In the wake of the financial crisis and 
related mortgage abuses, Congress and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) set out to simplify disclosures to mortgage applicants.213 The invitation to 
opt into an alternative tax regime could similarly require easy-to-read disclosures,214 
including key comparisons such as how much tax would be due under the generally 
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applicable law versus the alternative regime, for several scenarios likely for the 
taxpayer. The government could also publish extensive data on the past 
performance on each intermediary (and indeed on every alternative tax regime) 
showing how taxpayers who opted in fared compared to control group taxpayers, 
plus surveys of treatment-group taxpayers’ satisfaction. Whether or not government 
enables contractual reform, the government will need to regulate similar 
arrangements, such as the use of artificial intelligence in offering alternative 
regimes for student loans.215 
The government also might protect consumers with regulatory strategies 
specific to contractual tax reform. The government might prohibit particular 
provisions in agreements, or it might limit how far alternative tax regimes deviate 
from generally applicable tax law (e.g., requiring tax rates to remain within 3% of 
existing rates).216Similarly, the government might protect taxpayers by giving them 
an option to cap the amount they must pay under the alternative tax regime. For 
example, the government might specify that, in any year, a treatment-group 
taxpayer may opt out of the alternative tax regime and pay only 110% of what the 
taxpayer would have owed under the generally applicable tax laws. Such a cap 
would limit intermediaries’ opportunistic behavior.217 In early stages of contractual 
tax reform, the government could begin with a relatively low cap, but increase that 
percentage over time if taxpayer exploitation does not become a problem. 
2. Privacy Violations 
Much of the population believes that the private sector already maintains 
too much data about individuals.218 Contractual tax reform can incentivize 
taxpayers to reveal private information, such as their earnings potential.219 This 
private information, in turn, can be used to improve taxpayers’ utility while either 
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maintaining or increasing government revenues. But putting additional personal 
information into private hands creates the potential for abuse.220 
The debates around the privacy of personal data are well beyond the scope 
of this article.221 But much concern about privacy could be addressed by simply 
binding private tax intermediaries to the same tax information confidentiality 
provisions that already severely restrict the IRS’s ability to disclose taxpayer 
information.222  
3. Unconstitutional Conditions 
Arguably, the government should not coerce people to giving up their rights, 
even by paying them to do so. The Supreme Court has developed a “doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions,” asking when a condition on receipt of a government 
benefit is unconstitutionally coercive.223 Consider the example alternative tax 
regime where shopkeepers receive a tax-rate discount, in exchange for consenting 
to intensive electronic reporting.224 The taxpayers’ cash register and credit-card 
machines would report all activity electronically to the intermediary, potentially 
backstopped by a camera to prevent cash payments “under the table.” 225 The tax-
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rate discount is a government benefit, albeit one administered through a private 
intermediary, and the intensive monitoring is a condition on receipt of that benefit.  
If mandating intensive electronic reporting would be unconstitutional,226 
perhaps conditioning receipt of a tax benefit on such reporting might be 
unconstitutional too, though the use of private intermediaries makes this less likely. 
A two-part test governs.227 First, there must be an “essential nexus” between a 
“legitimate state interest” and the condition.228 Preventing tax avoidance is a 
quintessential legitimate state interest,229 and monitoring businesses for unreported 
income has a clear nexus with preventing tax avoidance.230 Second, there must be a 
“rough proportionality” between the condition and the benefit.231 If all eligible 
taxpayers opted in, that might indicate a lack of proportionality, suggesting that 
shopkeepers believe they need to participate to remain competitive. But so long as a 
substantial proportion of taxpayers decline to opt in, rough proportionality should 
be presumed. A similar analysis would likely uphold any alternative tax regime 
offered as opt-in.  
B. Equality and Equity 
1. Worsening Inequality 
Unless carefully designed, contractual tax reform might worsen inequality. 
Higher-income taxpayers tend to have better tax advisors, are less risk-averse, and 
provide proportionally higher potential tax increases to cover the costs of designing 
and administering an alternative tax regime. Intermediaries might focus their efforts 
on providing Pareto-efficient alternative tax regimes only for the well-off. At its 
worst, contractual tax reform would be like the bank system, which often leaves 
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lower-income individuals without banking services (“unbanked”) or with only 
limited access to banking services (“underbanked”).232  
Yet contractual tax reform can be designed to maximize the utility of the 
less-fortunate through progressive formulas regarding the allocation of profit (i.e. 
the excess of taxes paid by treatment-group taxpayers over control-group 
taxpayers). For example, when intermediaries offer alternative regimes to taxpayers 
making over $200,000 per year, the government might allow the intermediary to 
keep just 30% of all additional tax revenue generated by the treatment group, in 
comparison to the control group. By contrast, when intermediaries offer alternative 
regimes to taxpayers making under $40,000 per year, the government might allow 
the intermediary to keep 100% of the additional tax revenue generated. Such 
progressive formulas would incentivize creating alternative tax regimes that 
increase lower-income taxpayers’ utility.233  
2. Violating Horizontal Equity 
Horizontal equity is the principle that taxpayers earning the same income 
should pay the same amount of tax.234 Contractual tax reform presents two potential 
violations of horizontal equity. First, the intermediary would not offer the 
alternative tax regime to all taxpayers. Second, of those taxpayers invited to opt in 
and who do opt in, the government will randomly assign some percentage to the 
control group, who would be subject instead to the normal tax code.  
The first objection—that not all taxpayers are invited to opt into every 
alternative regime—is largely overcome by the fact that it is the private 
intermediary, not the government, deciding who is invited. Suppose that two 
individuals A and B both interview for a coveted private-sector job that pays 
$10,000 more after taxes than their current job. It is unobjectionable that only one 
of the two will get the job. This situation differs little from a private tax 
intermediary offering an alternative tax regime, which will increase after-tax 
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income by $10,000, to only one of A or B. Indeed, the government itself already 
uses invitations in tax administration. For example, the IRS has offered an 
invitation-only “compliance assurance process” (CAP) that allowed for ex ante 
(i.e., before return filing) resolution of large corporations’ tax matters.235 Current 
tax law offers numerous elections into different substantive rules, often with 
arbitrary conditions for eligibility.236 
The second objection—that the government randomizes some taxpayers 
who opt in into the control group—weakens when one considers that the IRS 
already uses randomization to audit taxpayers. 237 Just as auditing provides valuable 
information to the IRS, randomizing some taxpayers into the control group provides 
valuable information on whether an alternative tax regime has increased tax 
collections. A Kantian might object that randomization on individual taxpayers for 
informational purposes violates the principle that each person should be treated as 
an end rather than merely as a means.238 Even assuming the validity of this principle, 
however, the randomization into the control group is not treating taxpayers solely 
as a means. The goal of contractual tax reform is to better accommodate diverse 
individual preferences, which increases autonomy.239 A Kantian would argue that 
law has the imperative to respect each individual as an end in him- or herself, 
including his or her freedom to pursue his or her own ends and conception of the 
good life. Alternative tax regimes respect this imperative and are justifiable on 
Kantian grounds.240  
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Control group taxpayers may not get the same benefits as treatment group 
taxpayers, but they are no worse off. It is common for governmental programs to 
choose only a subset of applicants to participate,241 and contractual tax reform 
simply won’t work if everyone participates. A control group taxpayer might still 
benefit from randomization anyway, and not just because the experiment might 
produce information that leads to better tax policy. The control group taxpayer one 
time might be a treatment group taxpayer in another period.242 Meanwhile, an 
intermediary in theory could offer insurance, with payoffs equal to the premium 
divided by the probability of being randomized to control. Under expected utility 
theory, “it is well established that a risk-averse individual will purchase full 
insurance when the insurance contract is fairly priced.”243 That is, a rational 
purchaser should buy just enough insurance to be indifferent to those outcomes. 
Usually, insurance is expensive to provide because underwriting requires risk 
assessment, but here the risk is transparent, so insurance should be cheap. If such 
insurance is provided, to enable the insurance function to work, premiums should 
not be deductible, and payouts should not be taxed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has outlined how contractual tax reform could increase 
taxpayer utility without adversely affecting government revenues. Private 
intermediaries would design alternative tax regimes. Using artificial intelligence 
and other data-based models, the intermediaries would invite certain taxpayers to 
opt in. Of those who do so, the government would randomize some percentage to a 
control group to measure the revenue that those subject to the alternative regime 
would have raised if subjected to the generally applicable tax code. The 
intermediaries either could be for-profit or could be cooperatives, operated for the 
benefit of those who opt in. Regulation of insurers provides a model for regulating 
the private tax intermediaries, who are similar in many ways. Particularly in early 
implementations, the deviations from existing tax law would likely be relatively 
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small, but substantial benefits could still be achieved, including increased taxpayer 
utility and increased government tax revenues.  
